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THE ART OF REGULATION
DRAFTING: STRUCTURED
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
UNDER SECTION 355
by John W. Lee

John W. Lee is Professor of Law at MarshallWythe School of Law, College of Will iam & Mary.
Over the past two decades, Lee has published over
half a dozen articles on "active business" in section

355.
This article analyzes the 35-year evolution of the
section 355 regulations from the perspectives of the
jurisprudential dichotomy between general principles and detailed rules and administrative law
theory as to agency discretion.
Professor Lee wishes to express his gratitude to
the College of William & Mary for a research grant
that assisted in the preparation of this article, to Lee
Sheppard for her editorial assistance, and in particular to Alan Gunn for advice and encouragement
from start to finish .
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Section 355 and a 25-Year Promise Fulfilled
The legislative treatment of corporate divisions has
varied . In itiall y, they were included with the organ ization
provisions , and the predecessor to present section 355
spawned Gregory v. Helvering. Although the government
triumphed in the Gregory case, Congress though t Gregory was insufficient to protect the Federal fisc . Corporate
divisions offered too great an opportunity for bailing out
corporate earnings, and the tax-free blessing was withdrawn from them . This blanket consignment to tax purgatory, however, was argued to be too broad. By 1951 ,
Congress was receptive to the notion that the good and
the bad could be effectively distinguished, and corporate
divisions were revived, but tax deferral was denied to
transactions used principally as devices for the distribution of earnings and profits to shareholders. In regulations
issued in 1955, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) drew
the line mandated by Congress primarily by restricting
corporate divisions to distributions of an entire business.
Under these regulations, a corporate division also cou ld
effect a business division only by surrendering its taxfree status. In practice, the IRS relied on this active business requirement , but supplemented it with the argument
that some distributions essentially were equivalent to a
dividend and were , therefore, devices for a distribution of
earni ngs and profits. The first prong of this two-part test
did not fare well in the courts, and in 1964, after the
courts had determined that a single business cou ld be
TAX NOTES, August 28, 1989

divided , the lAS announced that it would revise the
regulations to permit the division of a Sing le business.
The promise of revision was hailed by the tax bar, and
advice that it be a complete overhaul of the existing
regulations soon was abundant. Recognizing that any
distribution necessarily produced a distribution of earnings, many commentators argued that the prese nce of a
good business purpose should be sufficient to pass the
tax deferra l test . They also thought that less reliance
should be placed on the definitional aspects of an active
business . In short, they wanted less formalism and more
inquiry into the question of whether a given distribution
could be supported by reasons other than the desire to
reduce the barriers between the shareholder and realization of the corporate earnings.

Many commentators . .. thought that less reliance should be placed on the definitional aspects of an active business.

Revision finally arrived a quarter of a century later, and
the final regulations recently promulgated under section
355 largely accomp li sh these goals. These regulations
give substantial guidance to the practitioner about
whether a transaction complies with them. More important ly, they deal with the underlying policy and provide
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their guidance at a level of sophistication that is unpa ralleled in Treasury regulations .
B. Standards and Rules Under Jurisprudence and
Administrative Law
Professor Kennedy posits two opposed methods in
American law for implementing substantive law: standards
and rules . Tax lawyers wi ll recognize this as the famil iar
substance and form debate in another guise.' A "standard " consists of a general principle or policy of a
particular body of substantive law. In this context , the
section 355(a)(1)(8) prohibition that the transaction not
be used as a " device " to distribute earnings and profits ,
that is, a " bailout ," serves as a standard . It corresponds
exactly to the underlying po licy. Under jurisprudential
theory, a standard is functional ; it requires the decision
maker to determine whether the facts of the particular
transaction merit th e desired treatment, 2 here tax deferral .

A 'rule ' . .. is ideally capable of generating precise and predictable answers.

A "ru le," by contrast, is definit ional. It is idea lly capab le
of generating precise and predictable answers. ' T he
"active busine ss" requirement of sections 355(a) (1)(e)
and (b) is a rule , albeit vague . The underlying policy of
the rule was prevention of a bailout , but the narrow
definitions used in the 1955 regulat ions and amplify ing
ruli ngs (particu lar ly the long-d iscredited two-bus iness
requ ire ment) were both under- and overinclusive, as
rules are wont. 4 For instance, pro rata divisions of two
readily saleable active business entities easily could meet
the Service's 1955 device and business purpose test.
However, vertical and functional divis ions failed the test
that there be two activ e pre-distribution bus inesses. Th is
was a failure of policy, at least in the case of non pro rata
separations.
In general , Professor Kennedy believes that the advantages of rules are (1) the restraint of arbitrariness by the
decision make r, and (2) the attainment of certai nty or
predictabi li ty .s A cost , however, is the inab ility to prescribe rules which will accurately achieve the underlying
policy objectives. Standards are more adaptable to po licy

' Kennedy , " Form and Substance in Private Law Adjud ic ation ,"
89 Harv . L. Rev . 1685 (1976) . This article does not att empt to
either explore o r d escribe Professor Kenn edy's central inqui ry
into the relati o nship between the " two o pposed rhetorical modes
for dealing with substantive issues. . . . ind ividua lism and altru is m," 89 Harv . L. Rev. at 1685, and ru te s and stand ards . " ,
"altrui st vi ews. , . Iead to willingne ss to resort to standards " . ,
wh ile individualism seems t o harmon ize with an in sistence on
rig id rul es rig idly app lied." Id. Al so , this article does not explore
Professor Kennedy 's method of tracing the conflict between
altruis m and individualism, viz., a "d ialectica l o r structuralist or
historicist or th e method of contrad ictions . Id. at 17 12, 173 1-37,
1774- 76.
2/d . at 1688 .
' Id, at 1687- 88.
' Id, at 1689.
Sid. at 1688- 89.
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goals ,6 Standards also differ from rules in that the former's
greater generality is an attempt to deal with as many
different potential fact patterns as pract icable. According
to jurisp rudential th inking, gene rality increase the number
of occasions of lawma king by the administrative agency ,
rather than the legislature, 7 The irony, as Whitman's
claSS ic artic le a reveals, is t hat the probab le legis lative
goal of t he device rest ricti on (orig inal ly enacted in 1951
as part of t he 1939 C ode predecessor of section 355) was
to decrease judicial intervention and possib ly administrative discretion as well .
Conversely, jurisprudential scholarship observes that
generally. detailed legislation decreases the discretion of
the decision maker ,9 This theory may be accurate when
applied to judges who follow the rules in deciding tax
cases (but not so much as to courts that fashion new
standards to overcome the ru les as witnessed, for instance, by the cases forging ways around the no deduction of start-up costs rule' O) , However, detai led regulations
promulgated by an administrati ve agency increase the
prinCipled discretion of the agency as a decision maker,
according to Professor Davis and subsequent admin istrative law scholarship ." "Structured discretion " serves public policy where rulemaking by the agency (here in the
form of IRS private letter rulings) is routine ly, if not
commonly , sought by the citizen ,12 Empirical knowledge
about the proportion of corporate divisions in which
private letter rul ings are sought, and the proportion

Sid, at 1689,
' Id. at 1689.
· Whitm an , " Draining the Se rbon ia n Bog : A New Approach, to
Corporate Se parations Under the 1954 Code," 81 Harv, L. Rev .
1194, 1202-03,1210 ( 1968) .
"Kenn edy , supra, note 1, at 1690. See Greg ory v. Commis sione r , 27 B.TA 223, 225 (1932) , rev 'd , 69 F,2d 809 (2d C ir.
1934), aff'd , 293 U .S. 465 (1935) (" A statut e so meticulously
drafted must be interp ret ed as a literal exp ress ion of taxing
po li cy , and leaves only the small in terstice s for jud ic ial cons ideration") . The Second Circuit for mulat ed the o ppo si ng fo rce to
literal ism of a broad , free-standing judicia l standa rd - bu siness
purpose,
,oSee Lee, " Start- Up Costs , Section 195, an d Clear Reflection
of Income; A Tale of Talismans, Tacked - On Tax Reform, and a
To uc h of Ba sic s," 6 Va, Ta x Rev . 1, 5- 6, 51-52, 56-58 (1986). Or
the Second C ircuit and Supreme Court in fashioning " bus in ess
purpose " as a counJ erpoint to detai led tax ru les and abdi cat ion
of judicial res ponsi bility .
" Davis , " Di sc ret io nary Justice, A Pre lim inary Inq uiry ," 103
(LS U Press 1969); see also Mashaw, " Bureauc ratic Justi ce ,
Manag ing Social Disability Claims," 103- 22 (Yale Univ , Press
1983) .
" Whitman , supra , note 8, at 1249 (" the practic e generally is to
get advance rul ings" as to corporate separatio ns) In a tele ph o ne
conve rsation shortly after the 1989 revi sio ns, an at torney in one
of th e corporate divisions of the Offic e of Chi ef Coun sel informe d
me that currently over 50 perc en t o f th e " in ven tory " o f priva te
le t ter ru ling s in the cor porate reorgani za tion a rea involved pro po sed c o rporate d iv isions. Accord ing to the attorney , a substan t ial number o f these ru ling requests inVOlve public c ompan ies,
wh ich I sus pect are position ing themselves after a two- to threeyear wait to unwind the re sults o f '60's d ive rsi fi cation with ou t
t rigger ing inside taxation as to appreciation . Th e attorney also
suspected that ma ny of th e section 355 tran saction s und er tak en
to shrink companies in order to ele ct subchapter S dur ing t he
pre- 1987 and 1987-88 trans ition period s d id not req ues t advance
priv ate letter ru lings.
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audited, would be he l p f ul here . A nother look at the use of
" dispensing power" under section 355 , that is, mandatory
advance approval by the Service, is warranted , given the
possibi l ity of "structured justice" under the new section
355 regulations .

Uncertainty encourages playing the audit lottery and a/so creates traps for the unwary.

Behavior modification goals also may influence the
policy maker choice between standards and rules. Rules
may encourage the risk-Iaker 10 walk the line, while
standards may discourage risk-taking by creating gray
areas .,3 ln a world where a very low percentage of income
tax returns are audited, however , gray areas appare n tly
e ncourage more aggressive or perhaps just more ignorant
tax planning and return preparation behavior." Uncertainty encourages playing the audit lottery and also
creates traps for the unwary. Conversely, overly detai led
rules may impose such high transaction costs that they
eliminate the undesirable behavior; this has been the
e ff ec t of the pa ssive loss rules, '5 for example. Professors
Doernberg's and McChesney 's public choice analysis
might suggest thai putting detailed rules in regulations
crea tes a lucrative specialty for the drafter when h e
en ters private practice .,G While public choice theory holds
for some rare cases, " section 355 and the new regulations
do not fit the pattern .'6

" Gifford , " Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Development , and Effective Conduct Regulat ion ," 56 Cornell l.
Rev . 409, 426-30, 435-37 (1971) .
" New York State Bar Ass 'n, Tax Section , "A Report on
Complexity and the Income Tax ," 27 Tax l. Rev. 325, 330 (1972) .
15Shavi ro , " Compliance and Enforcement under the Passive
Los s Regu lations," 29 Tax Management Memorandum 155, 161
(June 6,1988) .
'6Doernberg , " Th e Market for Tax Reform : Public Pain for
Private Gain ," 41 Tax Notes 965, 968 (Nov . 28, 1988) . See note
17, infra .
" Indeed , my first thought upon reading Doernberg & McChesney , "O n the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax
Reform ," 71 Minn . L. Rev. 913 (1987), wa s that a " public choice"
analysis could be applied more easily to staff drallers of ta x
sla tutes and regulations than to congressional tax committee
members . As to the latter, clearly , the tax committee members
take th e PACs' money , but for my view as to the exten t to which
they deliver (in full) , other than as to "t ransitional " rules , see Lee,
" Entity Classification and Integration : Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations and the Tax Leg islative
Process," 8 Va . Tax Rev. 57, 134-37 (1988) . As to " public choice "
and staff, I suspect that in certain limited instances such public
choice - ca rve-a-n iche analysis is valid (certain specia lists in
subchapters K and S come to mind , see Moore , " A Proposal to
Reduc e the Compl ex ity of Tax Regulation s," 37 Tax Notes 1167
(September 14, 1987) (semble)) . In most instances , however , I
suspect that th e sources of complexity on the part of legislative
and Treasu ry staff are to be found elsewhere - for instan ce , a
preference (possibly institutional) for detailed legislation (or
com mittee report s at least) in order to cover most conceivable
transactions , see S. Cohen , " Complexity of Regulations Reflects
Aggr essive Tax Planning, " 37 Tax Noles 1280 (Dece mber 21 .
1987) ; great ability to so conceive ; and a little experience in a
large tax department, wh ere maste ry of detailed tax statutes/
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The policy choice may not have to be between rules
and slandards . Rules may be combined with standards ,
as in cases where "safe harbors " are allowed despite the
use of a facts-and-circumstances test as the underlying
standard. Some tax commentators advocated this format
as providing certa i nty for generalists who could read the
Code , comb i ned with "an area for those who want to
venture into it where , if you really understand the cases,
you can advise your client intelligently ."'9
Conventional jurisprudential wi sdom , especially according to Professor Kennedy , also holds that rules and
standardS tend to shade into each other . For instance, a
standard may be implemented by a number of per se

regu lati ons is incu lcated . Th e res ulting statut e and impl ementing regulations can be handled on ly by special ists. Such
statutes and r egula t ions may b e appropriate wher e high bracket
taxpayers have knowingly ente red the "th ic ket," see " Hearings
on Tax Shelters, Accoun ting Abu ses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms" before the House Ways and Means Comm , 98th
Cong ., 2d Sess . 32-33 (1984) (colloquy betw een Rep. Don Pease
and Assi stant Secretary for Tax Policy John (" BUCk ") Chapoton),
reprinted in 6 " A Legi sl ative History of th e Tax Reform Act of
1984" (Bernard D. Reams . Jr . J .D., Ph .D., Ed . 1985) (" Ta x
Reform 1984" ).
Mr. Chapolon. Unques tio nably . . . they will tend to co mplicate . .. . That is why eve ry attempt has been made
particularly in the tim e value o f mon ey changes to provid e
excep tion s so they do not apply to th e everyday taxpayer
in normal transact ions and apply prinCipally to la rge ta x
transactions, tax shelters, and otherwi se, wh ere very soph isticated planning is involved.
Mr. Pease. So in an effo rt to close off abusive ta x
shelters, we are going to furth er complicate a tax cod e
many people feel is already too compl icated .
Mr. Chapoton. I do not think we need to apologize whe n
we complicate the tax code for very co mplicated tran sactions, and that is the inten t here.
But I also believe that they are im practical wh ere small taxpayers
and less sophisticated advisers frequ ently dwell. As my co ll eague
Alan Gunn observes, th e divorce rules Should not be overly
deta iled. See also Berman , " The Alim ony Deduction: Time to
Slaughter the Sacred Cow ," 5 Amer. J. of Tax Policy 49, 59
(1986) . See a/so note 18, infra .
,8Again such overly compl ex, detailed provis ions (whether
stat utory or regulato ry , should not be used in the case 01
everyday transact ions unless a two-tier ta x regime (sim ple!
co mplex) can be implemented. Alan Gunn poi nts to the fiduciary
income provis io ns, subchapter J . Simi larl y, th e ill- fated 1954
House corporate provision s (subchapt er C) and th e equally illfated 1960 House-passed revised su bchapter K dist inguished
between little and big taxpayer s subject to their regimes . The
1980 Installm ent Sales Revision Act and accompanying regulations al so more subtly distinguished between simple and complex provi sions . Even th e Subchapter S Rev is ion Act in effect
distinguishes sharp ly between "virgin " S corporations and S
corporation converts (formerly C corporation o r inh eritor of C
E&P) . My guess is none of the two-ti er systems really work well
or would have worked well. But the tec hnique merits more
thought . See generally Surrey , " Compl exi ty and the Internal
Revenue Code : The Problem of the Manag ement of Tax Detail ,"
34 Law & Contemp . Probs . 673 , 696 n . 28 (1969) .
" Panel Discussions on Income Tax ReviSions before the
House Ways and Means Comm " 86th Cong ., 1st Sess . 883
(1959) (colloquy between Chairman Wilbur Mills and Hugh
Calkin s, Esq .) (Hearings on "Tax Revi sio[1 Compendium" of
Papers on Broadening the Ta x Base), reprinted in 151953-1972
Legislative Histories , Laws & Cong ressio nal Doc's (Bernard D.
Reams , Jr., J .D., Ph .D., ed . 1985) ("1953-1972 Legislative Histori es").

1031

SPECIAL REPORTS
rule s, either in the statute or accompanying regulations
or case law adjud ic ation. Conversely , desiring to avoid
inju stice , decision makers may crea te so many exceptions
that the rule becomes a standard in effect .20 Adm in ist rative
law scho lars, on the other hand, be lieve that agencies
us ing structured discretion - for examp le , by issuing regulations (ru le making) setting forth specif ic factors to be
Ll sed in balancing tes ts implementing the desired standards and po l ic ies - can implement standards effectively
wlli le maintain i ng the bureauc rat's discretion judgment
in application .21 They believe that deta i led rules useful in
channeling agency exe rci se of d iscretion can be develo ped by fi rst considering one problem at a tim e, then
ann ou nc ing the hypoth etical cases as rulings an d refraining from generalizing . General principles or standards
can be d ivin ed from th is expe ri en ce . Later, the agency
can formulat e regulations to implem e nt the standards in
th e fo rm of structur ed di scr etion n In the tax law, rules
and standards often confl ict , both in the context of
Jud ic ial re vi ew of age ncy d iscr etion and especia lly i n
doct rin al areas. 2J

The best policy usually is 'to legislate broad
frameworks for administrative policymaking.'

Tax th eo re t icia ns, in cluding Harva rd's Professors
Brown a nd Surrey, hav e debated for some time the
advantages of genera li ze d tax statu tes , th at is, standa rds ,
ve rsus deta iled , rule-orient ed tax statu tes .24 W riting un der
Pro fessor Brown 's tutelage , Whitm an called for a focus
on the und e rlying policy (dev ic e) and would have dimin is hed th e role of the additional mechanica l statutory
detail of th e activ e business test. 2S Recently , the majority
of stu dents o f taxation follow the Surrey school calling
for a general tax sta tut e that is implement ed and amplified
thr o ugh indi s putab ly deta i led Trea su ry regulat ions . They
pre fer th e great er fl exibility of administrative ly amending
regulati o n s in li g h t o f deve lop ing admin istrat ive and

" Kennedy. supra note 1. at 1700-01 .
" See note 11 . supra.
" Dav is. supra note 11 , at 60.
" See no te 1O. s upra .
" Brown , " An Approach to Subchapter C," 3 Ta x Revi sion
Co mpendium 1619, 1619- 20 (1960) (detailed tax statut es lead to
defI cienc ies and ano mali es appearing wh ich requ ires eve n more
intri cate elaborations of pattern; fundamental source is an attempt
to eliminate the necessity for responsible administration) : Surrey,
supra note 18, at 695-702, 703-07 (de bate between gene ra lized
and part icu larized ta x statu tes: co ncludes ideal is genera lized
statute with deta iled regu lations) . Interestingly, the Tax Reform
Act of 1969. wh ic h wa s Surrey's brainchild , see Lee, supra 8 Va .
Tax Rev. at 132. n. 346, rarel y took th is tac k (section 385
con stit utes a cons pi cuo us except ion) . Th e debate had begun as
ea rl y as the 1920s. See notes 31 and 32. in fra. and accompanying
text.
" Whitman . supra no te 8, at 1253-57 .
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judicial exper ience und er the st at ut e.26 Prof essor Davi s
agrees that the best policy usually is " to legis lat e broad
frameworks for administrative policy-making ."27
Under the Surrey approach , the role of courts in
reso lving the substance and form d ic hotomy in tax law is
lessened . Section 355 do es not fit this model . The Fi rst
Ci rcuit's land mark op inion in Rafferty ,28 i ncorporati ng
Whitman 's vision, forms both the skeleton and mu c h of
the f lesh of the " device" and " act iv e b us in ess" porti ons of
th e long-awaited 1989 revisions . The genera l statute cum
d etailed regulations mode l closely pa ralle ls Professor
Dav is' thinking about " discretionary justice" in administrat ive law and in particular his concept of "str uct ured
discretion ."29 Section 355 and the case law an d the
variou s st ages of the regulations interpreting it prese nt
an idea l laboratory for exploring these themes .3o

II. SECTION 355: FROM THERE TO HERE
A. The Statute
The hi story of section 355 itself, as ably tra ced by
Whitman, plays out in m icrocosm the debates between
sta ndards and rules and ab ou t who is the proper actor for
the development o f the criteria - C ongress , the courts , or
the adm i nistrators. The reo rgan ization provi sio ns through
the Revenue Act of 1921 fo l lowed the phi losophy of
genera l statutory principles w ith Trea su ry formul ating
specific rUles . 31 However. th e first provisions explicit ly
26E.g ., "Complex ity and the Income Ta x, " su pra note 14. at
348-51 . But see Cohen, " Remarks," 26 Nat'l Tax J . 311. 311 - 12
(1974) . Fo r an exce llent . br ief discussion of the recent pattern ,
in cluding the "worst of all worlds .. . ex treme ly detailed statutes ... wit h broad grants of regulato ry au thority ... . ," see Evan s,
"Th e Condition of th e Tax Leg isla ti ve Pro cess," 39 Tax N otes
1581 , 1590 (June 27 , 1988).
USee Davis , su p ra note 11 , at 38.
28 Ra fferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d at 767 (1971) , cer t.
denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972) .
29A ru le may pro vi de that at the right end th e answer is
always yes. and that at th e left end th e answer is always
no; when it does tha t it confines di sc retion to the middle
te rrit ory . But th e rule may also st ructure the discret ion in
that mi dd le ter ritory . For instance , it may provide that in
exe rc ising discretio n. th e agenc y will cons id er three factors. Th at mu ch is a part ial st ru cturing of discre tion . The
rule also may state the res ult wh en the th ree fac tors pull
toge th er, but provide th at th e resu lt will be worked o ut
from case to case wh en the thr ee pull aga inst each ot her.
Suc h a rule structures di sc retion , leaving many questi ons
open . A ru le which does not genera lize bu t whi ch gives
ill ustratio ns may help str ucture discretion.
Davis, supra note 11 , at 103.
3°1 confe ss tha t I am no impartia l obse rv er, however, having
soug ht to influ ence the directions of the revised regulat ions, and
I am proud of my contributions . See Lee, " Functional Divi sio ns
and Other Corporate Separations Under Sec tio n 355 Aft er
Rafferty ." 27 Tax L. Rev . 453 (1972) : Lee , " Proposed Regulation s
Under 355 Overhaul Device Te st and Sing le-Busin ess DiVisions."
46 J . Tax. 194 (1977 ). Th e fina l regu lations showed me how
mu ch I missed . however, as did res tudy ing Wh it man's Serbon ian
Bog in ligh t of the th ought of Professo rs Ken nedy and Davis. I
am grateful to my coll eagues Al an Gunn and Charles Koch for
stee ring me to th em.
3' Wh itman. supra note 9, at 1199. See Hearings on H.R. 8245
before th e Sen . Comm . on Finance. 67th Cong ., 1st Sess . 5
(1 921 ) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adam s, Tax Advisor , Tr easu ry
Dept ., dra ft ing goal of "a rather simpl e tax law th at th e averag e
man can understand ") , reprinted in 9SA Interna l Revenu e Act s of
th e Un it ed States 1909-1950 Legi slative Hi stories Laws and
Admini stra tive Doc uments (Bernard D. Reams, Jr . revised 1979)
("1 909-1950 Legislative Histori es") .
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permitting tax - free corporate divisions, enacted in the
Revenue Act of 1924, show a reversed course under new
tax advisers to Treasury. The advisers preferred minute
articulation of the reorganization provisions with the
avowed intention of providing predictabi lity in al l conceivable situations. 32
Nevertheless, Congress predictably33 failed to anticipate
the avo idance techniques or "mere devices" such as
those employed by Mrs . Gregory to avoid dividend treatment on a distribution by her wholly owned corporation .
Relying upon the corporate spin-off provisions introduced
in 1924, she caused her wholly owned holding company
to transfer shares in a publicly owned "target" subsidiary
to a newly-formed wholly owned subsidiary which t he
ho lding company spun off to her three days later . Three
days later, she liquidated the new subsidiary, obtaining a
stepped-up basis at a capital gain rate in the shares,
wh ich she then sold to the buyer at no further gain . In
1932, th e Board of Tax Appeals uphe ld Mrs . Gregory's
scheme as a transaction clearly within the confines of the
statutory language Y
Th e Democratic Congress of 1933, generally unsympathetic to business problems, was "acutely hostile to tax
avoidance schemes."35 Res isting its first inclinat ion to
repeal the reorganizatio n provisions in toto, 36 Congress
in 1934 repealed only the spin-off provision and tightened
up the definition of reorganizations in genera l.37 Split-ups
still were permitted under that genera l reorganization
definition. 36 The Second Circuit in Helvering v. Gregory39
contemporaneously reversed the Board 's decision . The
Supreme Court affirmed this reversal, finding no " business or corporate purpose" in the transaction , which was
a "mere device, " "a contrivance ," and " an elaborate and
devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization."40 Thus , the courts had fashioned the
"b usiness purpose" standard which came to be applied in
all reorgan iza tions .
According to Whitman , during the years 1947 to 1951,
manifest congressional antipathy to judicial innovations

" Whitman, supra note 9, at 1199. See Hearings on H.R. 6715
before the Sen . Comm . on Finance, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 57
(1924) (state ment of A. W. Gregg, Special Ass't to Treasury,
"complications come primarily from a complicated policy," including reorganizations . " [T)he bill will cover a given case
definitely and certainly. Under the existing law there are hundreds of cases where nobody knows the effect of the transaction
upon Ihe tax . This law is definite enough so that th e taxpayers
will be able to tell the effect of a given transaction .. .. "),
reprinted in 2 1909-1950 legislative Histories.
" Brown , supra note 24, at 1619; Whitman , supra note 8, at
1198k and note 11, at 1200.
3' Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T. A. 223 (1932), rev 'd 69 F.2d
809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 293 U.S. 465 (1935) .
35Wh itman, supra note 9, at 1200.
" Prel imin ary Report of a House Ways & Means Subcommittee,
"Prevention of Tax Avoidance," 73d Cong ., 2d Sess . 8-9 (Comm .
Print 1933), reprinted in 100 1909-1950 legislative Histories.
3' Wh itman, supra note 9, at 1200-01; Schneider, "I nternal
Revenue Code Section 355 Before and After the Tax Reform Act
of 1986: A Study in the Regu lati on of Corporate Tax Bailouts,"
39 Ok la. L. Rev. 567, 581 (1986).
3SSee Treas. reg . 86, art. 112(g)-3 (1935), reprinted in 140 19091950 Legislative Histories ; Spangler v. Comm issioner, 18 T.C.
976 (1952).
39 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
'°293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).
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in the reorganization area was the impetus for the divis ive
reorganization provision 's specific detailed ru les . Congress acted with a view that courts wo ul d not add new
conditions to the statute," on the theory that detailed
rules lesse n the decis ion maker's discretion. Consequently, the 1951 predecessor of section 355 contained
an active business requirement and a device restriction .
The requ irement of continued act ive conduct of a trade
or business was designed to preclude a transitory bus iness from qualifying for tax deferral. Arguab ly, the devic e
clause was intended by Congress in 1951 (or at least by
the House in 1948) to supersede judicial business purpose
and continuity of interest doctrines, but this orig inal
intent was not to be fu Ifilled .42

Manifest congressional antipathy to judicial
innovations in the reorganization area was the
impetus for the divisive reorganization provision's specific detailed rules.

The House dratt of the 1954 Code proposed an exclu sive asset characterization test for tax-free corporate
separations. A 10-year ordinary income "taint" would be
placed upon separated stock in an " inactive" corporation.
To avoid this characterization, a separated corporation
had (1) to have been engaged in an " active business" f or
five years prior to the separation, (2) to have maintained
separate books from the retained business, and (3) to
have passed an active business income test (not more
than 20 percent passive income).'3 Because cautiou s
Republicans still were in control of both Houses 01
Congress," the Senate and Conference bills retained th e
1951 format of not permitting tax-free separations of an
existing corporation into act ive and inactive entities. The
Senate criticized a 10- year taint as permitting " a person
in a posit ion to afford a 1O-year delay in receivi ng income
to do so at capital gain rather than dividend rates ."45
Section 355 of the 1954 Code requ i res (a) that the
resulting corporations engage in the act ive conduct of a

" Whitman , supra note 8, at 1203-03.
" The busi ness purpose and continu ity of interest requ irem enl
have appeared in every ver sio n of the corporate division regu la·
tions from 1953 through 1989. Compare Treas. reg . 118, sectio n
39.112(b)(11 )-1 (b) (1953), with rev ised Treas . reg . sections 1.3552(b) and (e) (1989) .
" H.R. Rep. No. 1337. 83d Cong .. 2d Sess. A122 (1954 ),
reprinted in I Internal Revenue Acts of the United States: The
Revenue Act of 1954 with Legislative Histories and Congressional
Documents (Bernard D. Reams, ed . 19B2) (" 1954 Code Legisl ative History") .
" Former Commissioner Sheldon Cohen, who served as start
in the drafting of the 1954 Code , once told me that the Repu b·
lican-controlled Senate Finance Committee rejected innovative
and , hence, controversial approaches in 1954 because it feared
they could drag the bill to the next term when the Democrat s
might gain control of the Senate and the Committee. See also
Darrell, "Internal Revenue Code of 1954- A Striking Example or
the Legislative Process in Action ," 1955 So. Cal. Tax Ins!. 1, 1215. They did and the Republicans have never con trolled bolh
Houses of Congress since.
'5S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong ., 2d . Sess . 51 (1954). reprinted in
21954 Code Leg is lative Histo ry.
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trade or business immed iate ly after the div is ion which
bu sin ess had not been acquired in a recognition transac tion during a five - year look back , and (b) that th e transaction not have bee n used principally as a device for the
di str ibut io n of earnings and profits, (The two o ther statutory requirem ent s are not relevant to this article .) Congress enacted general requir eme nts , but the active busi ness c lau se wa s more defin it ional and the device clause
more policy orien ted,
B. The Regulatory Factors
1. Introduction
a. The Device Restriction . A com mon 1954 Code tax
planning technique consisted of accumu lating i ncom e
in side a close ly held corporation , and then bailing out
that accumu lat ion at s hareholder- level capital gains rates
with no furth er in si de corporate tax on a liquidation
gov ern ed by th e General Utilitie s r ule, or the death of th e
shareho lder,'6 This d evic e was mot ivated by extr e mely
hig h in dividual income tax rates , much low er corporate
inc ome tax rates , low capital gains rat es, and the codified
General Utiliti es ru le. A witne ss at House Way s and
Me ans Committee Chairman Wilb ur M i lls ' 1958 Hearings
on General Revenue Revision stated t hat use of graduated
brack ets by close C corporations to retai n earn i ng s
usually taxed at 30 to 45 pe rc e nt of th e maximum in dividual marginal rate rendered " [t)h e high ra tes that our tax
law s now hav e for indi viduals . .. simply a facade ."47 Trea su ry had sugg es ted m eeting th is problem by tax ing
corporation s as pass thrOlJgh entities more than 40 years
before ,'"

"' Panel Discu ss ions, supra not e 19, at 887-89 (co ll oquy between Cha irman Mills and Hugh Calk ins); Lewis, "A Proposed
New Tre atm ent for Corporate Dist ributi ons and Sales in Liquida ·
tion," 3 Ta x Rev ision Compend ium 1643 (1960), reprinted in 14
1953-1 972 Legi slative His tori es, See Lee, supra , 8 Va, Tax Rev , at
95 and n. 141,99, and 101 ,
''' Hearings on General Revenue Revision before the House
Comm , on Ways and Means, 85th Cong " 2d Sess , (Part 2) 3443
(1958) (statement of Paul Ziffren , Esq .), reprinted in 10 Internal
Revenue Acts of the United States : Reve nu e Acts of 1953- 1972
with Legis lati ve Histor ies, Laws & Congress ional Documents
(BernMd D, Reams , Jr., ed, 1985) (" 1953-1972 Leg islat ive Histories"), See also Hea ring s on H,R, 13511 (Revenue Act of 1978)
Before th e Se nat e Finance Comm " 95th Cong " 2d Sess, (Part 1)
136 ( 1978) (stat eme nt of Sec reta ry of Treas ury Blu menthal)
("We think that this gradClat ion at the bott om is rea lly what has
bee n re ferr ed to in the lite rature as th e ultimate tax have n or
shelt er for a high-i nc ome in dividu al") reprinted in 5 Tax Refor m,
1978 " A Leg islative Hi story of the Revenue Act of 1978" (ed ited
by Va nderbi lt University Law Library Sta ff 1978),
"Treasury staff had sho wn the way to a remedy as ea rly as
1919 trea ting co rporations as partne rships for tax purposes.
Treasu ry contemp lated cu rr en tl y taxing own ers on und istributed
entily-Ievel net income of "a ll co rporations who se principal
stock holders regu larly devote their ch ief time and attention to
the act ive conduct of the aff airs of th e corpora ti on , .. it might
also be expedi ent to requ ire . . , th e prin cip al stockho lders to
ow n.
, say 85 pe rce nt [of the stoc k ], an d to pla ce a lim it , say
10, upon the number of shareholde rs not regu lar ly devot ing th ei r
ch ief ti me and att ent io n to the active con duct of th e affairs of th e
persona l corpora ti on ," Treas . Dept" " Notes on the Revenue Act
of 1918," 66th Cong. , 1st Sess. 5-7 (1919) , reprinted in 9419091950 Legislative Histor ies, Wh en th e opportunity first arose to
implemen t this poli cy, Treas ury fl inched . See Hear in gs on H.R .
82 45, supra note 31 , at 9- 15, 68-69, 71-72 , 210-17, 244-46, 26266, a n(1 333-35,
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Section 355's active busi ness test and device restriction
were designed to thwart a " bailout" through sale of
accumulated assets held in a separate corporation by
shareholders who continued to hold interests in the
parent corporation with undiminished operating assets ,
Courts had fashi oned the free-floating business purpose
requirement in Gregory to thwart just this sort of attempted bailout. The Supreme Court also fashioned th e
"co ntinu ity of interest" doctrine , which requires a substantial continuation of equity interests in the po streorganizat ion corporation(s) by the hi stor ic pre-reorganization shareholders 49 Immediate sale of all of th e stock
in one of the post- division corporations, as in Gregory ,
also would violate this doctrine ,
b, Evolution of Regulatory Approach. The section
355 regulations promulgated in 1955 re lied primari ly
upon a definitional act ive business test to police poten ti al
bailouts, as manifested by it s order in the regulations and
comparative development of detail. They placed th e device provision next and effectively limited it to (1) divis ions
of corporations with heavy concentration s of non-f iv eyear active business assets and (2) post-div is ion sales .
The backstop to these requirements was th e otherwise
undefined general reorganization business purpose and
continuity of interest requirements . The examples lim ited
discussion to the active business requi rement. Furth ermore , many of the active business examples went beyond
the gen e ralization in text , thus often raising as m any
questions as they answered sD
The Ta x Court in Coad y 51 inval idated the pre-div ision
separate business requirement of the 1955 regulations as
go ing beyond the purpose of the statut e. Two circuits
agreed ,52 and the Serv ice capitulated , prom is ing to revise
the regulations by el i minating th e pre- d i vi sion separa te
active bus i ness requiremen t,53 Whitman advocat ed restruc turing the regu lations by re ly ing primarily on the
device standard, w ithout limit in g glosses, while diminish ing th e importanc e of the active business, busin ess
purpose , and continuity of interest tests , He argued for
permitting divisions of both functions of an integrated
business (functi onal division s ) and branch es o r even
compone nt s of a singl e business (vertica l divi sions), 5.\
The First Circuit in RaffertyS5 adopted Whitman 's arguments to justi fy separation of a large hotel chain by
functions such as land purchasing , construction , hotel
manag e ment , and leas ing divi sions , in dictum ,

"See, e,g" Pme//as Ice Co, v, CommiSSIOner, 287 U,S. 462
(1933); Faber, " Con tinu ity of I nterest and Bu siness Enterpr ise: Is
II Time to Bury Some Sacred Cows? ," 34 Ta x Law 239 (1981) ,
lOTreas. reg . sections 1.355-1 (d)(5), (10), (11) , (12) , and (16)
(1955) , See generally Massee, "Sec tion 355: Di sposa l of Un wanted Assets in Conn ection with a Reo rgan ization, " 22 Tax L,
Rev , 439, 461-64 (1967).
" Coady v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 771 . 777 (1960) , nona c q.
Rev Rul. 61 · 198, 1961-2 C,B, 61, n onacq, revoked, Rev, Rul. 64147, 1964- 1 G.B. (Part 1) 139, aff 'd p er curiam , 289 F,2d 490 (6 th
Ci r, 1961).
" 289 F,2d 490 (6th Ci r, 1961 ); acc ord, Unit ed States v, Marre tt ,
325 F,2d 28 (5 th Cir. 1963) .
" Rev. Ru!. 64- 147, supra note 51 ,
" Whit man, supra note 8.
" Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2 d 767 (1st CiL 197 1), cer !.
denied, 408 U.S, 922 (1972) .
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In 1977 Treasury and the Service proposed reviSions to
the section 355 regulations which adopted the core of the
Rafferty approach , but which lacked some of the finer
details.56 The 1977 proposed amend ments rearranged the
regulation factor s in the fo llowing new order: business
purpose , continuity of interest, device , and active business Y T he ac tive business portion of the 1977 proposals
dropped the pre-division sepa rate active business requirement and substantially rewrote the accompanying
examples, which still extended beyond the generalizations
in text in a few instances. 58 The 1977 proposed revision s
of the device prov ision elaborated the princip les in text
both as to subseque nt sa les and use of assets and added
two examples. 59 There was scant modification of the
business purpose test except for a refere nce to coex tens ive sha rehold e r business p ur pose and four business purp ose exa mples 60 The 1977 proposals continu ed
the m re reference to th e continuity of interest doctrin e
with no exa mpl es. s1 Th e examples that were prov id ed to
ex plain th e devic e restric tion often raised more questions
than they answered .52

The 1989 final regulations are a paradigmatic
fusion of rules and standards implemented
through factors that closely relate to the underlying policy or standard.

As th e p roduct of long ad m in istr ative exper ience with
sec tion 355, the 1989 fi nal reg ulations are a parad ig matic
fu sion o f rules and standards im p lemented throug h factors that close ly relate to the underlying po licy or stan dard . De-emphasis of the active business test and the
predominant weight given to the func ti ona l device stan dard continues from 1977 the proposa ls.G 3 But this time,
the regulation drafters implemented the device standard
through a balancing of non-per se factors evidencing
device with factors evidencing non-device, including business purpose, tested against the underlying standard of
preventing bailouts .s4 Addit ionall y , a nondividend equiva-

" See Lee, " Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhau l DeVice Test
an d Sing le-Business Divisions ," 46 J. Tax. 194 (1977).
" Prop. Treas. reg . sec tions 1.355-2(b} and (c) , and -3 (1977) .
'· Compare Treas . reg . section 1.355-1 (a) (1955) (first sentence)
with Prop. Trea s. reg. section 1.355-3{a){ I)(i} (1989). See , e.g.,
Prop . Treas. reg. section 1.355-3(c). Ex. (5) (what if no net
lease), Ex . (7) (what if continued relationsh ip as to warehouse
and delivery services) . Ex. (12) (wh at if in same business, but not
operated as unit, or what if expansion through purchase of
ongoing concern and not se lf-cons truction), Ex. (13) (what if not
net lease). Ex . (14) (what if secondary business sells. etc., on ly
to related company) (1977) .
'· Prop Treas. reg . sections 1.355-2(c)(2). (3). and (4) (1977) .
""Prop. Treas. reg . sec tion 1.355-3(b)(2) Ex s. (1977).
· ' Id. sec ti on 1.355-2(b)(I) .
62 Prop. Trea s. reg . section 1.355-2(c)( 4) (1977).
" Again, th e order in the regulations appears to be roughly
from greater to lesser im portance. Treas. reg. sections 1.3552{b), (c), and (d), and (2) (1989) .
64 1d. secti ons 1.355-2(d)(2) and (3) .
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lency test or "escape hatch " ord in ar ily trump s any device
factors .65 Moreover, the drafters provided instru ct ions as
the weighing process .S6 The activ e business test has been
clarified and simpl if ied in spots Y T he 1989 regulations
re ly heav ily on a clarif ied business purpo se requirement
to deny tax deferra l to undeserving tran sact io ns that do
not ot her wis e vio late the dev ice restriction .66 T he continuity of business interest requirement also has been
strengthened in an effort to get at th ese transactions .69
Th e 1989 final regulations increase the number and
quality o f examples for every aspect of t he regulations
and often exp lain in th e " Preamble" the ra ti ona le of the
furth er examp les .?O Moreover, th e text great ly expands
the general pri nCiples , particularly as to the business
purpose and device provisions, and the accompany in g
examples often refer to the app licable principle All in al l,
this process constitutes a major step in th e maturity of
regulation drafting, thro ugh lessen ing the age ncy's unbridled discret ion in favor of structured discretion .
2. Active Business Rule
a. 1955 Regulation and Coady Rejection , The 1955
regulations gave priority to the active busi ness requirement. The first sentence of those regu lations prohibited
tax-free division of a singl e business . Active business was
defined in detail, with 16 examples tha t often contain
cryptic facts without accompany ing pr inciples in th e text
of th e regu lat ions, wh ic h Professor Davis commends as a
first step when an agency is as yet unsure o f th e most
practicable rule or standard to use. ?1 It is c lear that the
reg ulati on drafters chose the active business test, and in
particular th e req uireme nt of at leas t two active b usinesses , as the primary barrier to bailout corporate
divisions. This conc lu sion is confirmed in the eyes of
Whitm an and others by the Service's ear ly revenue rulings
under section 355, which principally relied on th e ac tiv e
bu si ness test. The Serv ice 's use of the device provision
was li mited to finding dividend equiva lency w ith th e
primary focus on post-separation sa les . The Service
apparently relied equal ly on business purpose and co ntinu ity of interest. 72
Probably re flecting th e Commissioner's deliberate litigat ing sta nce , t he early corporate divi sio n case law under

"" d . sec ti on 1.355-3(d)(5)
"o ld. sec tion s 1.355-2(d)(2)(ii). (ii i)(A). (3)( ii ), (4) Exs. (2), (3)
"' Id. sec ti on 1.355-3.
" Id. sec ti on 1-3 55-2(b) .
" Id. sec ti on 1.355-2(c) Alrea dy commen tators have scored

the cont inuity prov iSions of the revised regu lati ons. Willens ,
Mas on & Choate, " The Fin al Section 355 Regulat ions." 20 Tax
Advi ser 22 1, 223 (1989) (fail ure to deal with wh en a new
sharehol der's in tere st ripens into a hi stO ri C interest "appears to
be Ihe most glaring defect" ).
'O Se e, e.g., "Corporate Separations : In co me Taxes . Sup plementa ry Information, " 54 Fed . Reg. 283 , 285 . 287, 288 (Ja n. 5,
1989) ("Preamble").
"Davis , supra note 11 , at 60 (a ru le can be lim ited to reso lv ing
one or more hypothetical cas es Without ge neraliZing) . Th e lirst
step is to invent ru les, as by pflvate leiter rulin gs . as problems
arise until a body of rules can be fa shion ed . Id. at 15- t 7, 219. See
Preamble, supra at 54 Fed. Reg. 285 (continu it y examples based
on Revenue Rulings).
" Rev. Ru l 64 -102, 1964- 1 C. B. pI. 1 at 136 : Whi lman. supra
note 9. at 121 1. 1215-16. 1234 -37, 1239-45: accord Lee. supra
note 30. at 474-77.
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the 1939 and 1954 Codes predominantly involved owneroccupied real estate, then as now a likely candidate for a
device,lJ but the cases turned on active business. 74 T he
Treasury's ru le-oriented approach to the active business
test generated a functional response. This is a frequent if
not inevitable pattern in the tax case law which often
produces functional-definitional conflicts, that is , standard-ru le conflicts that dest roy the certainty and predictability of a definitiona l tesUS The Tax Court in Coady v.
Commissioner7" considered a non pro rata vertical div ision of a single bus iness between feuding equal shareholders. A finding that it was a device for distribution of
earnings was imp lausible because the post-distribution
corporations were not under common ownership . Both
pos t- distribution corporations were actively conducting
a trade or bu siness . Congress clearly meant to al low tax
deferra l for this transaction. 77 However, the 1955 regulations' two-bus iness rule under the active business test
prohib ited both vertical and f unctiona l d ivisions of a
Single busi ness.

The early corporate divis/on case law under
the 1939 and 1954 Codes predominantly involved owner-occupied real estate . ...

The Tax Court majority in Coady looked to the standard or policy under lying the act ive business rule, which
is prohibition of tax-free separation of a corporation into
active and inact ive entities. 7 • Skillfully parsing the statute
to focus on active entities , each active ly conducting a
five-year- old trade or business, even if it had been a
si ng le trade or business prior to the division, the Coady
major ity iqnored other rule-oriented legislative history

'Pream bl e. supra at 288 ("separation of owner-occupied real
estat e wi ll be subject to careful scrutiny under the active business requ irements. Also, such a separation may be subject to
close examinat ion under the related function device factors .. . ").
" See. e.g., Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.
1959) : Wilk ins v. United States, 188 F. Supp . 91 (So . D. III. 1960);
Appleby v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 755, 764 (1961), aft'd, 296 F.2d
925 (3d Cir.): ce rt. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1962); Elliott v. Commis sioner. 32 T.C. 283 (1959) . See generally, Massee, "Section 355:
Disposal of Unwanted Assets in Connection with a Reorganization ." 22 Tax L. Rev . 439, 457-59 (1967) .
" See passa ges cited in note 10 as to conflicts in start-up and
bUSiness exp ansion areas. I am currently writing an article on
Rojas v. Commissioner. 90 T.C . 1090 (1988), on appeal to the
Ninth Circ uit. which in part exp lores such a dialectic under the
tax be nef it rule. I had just read Shaviro's application of the "well
known dichotomy between rules and standards as tools of
substantiv e law" (see Shaviro , supra note 15), and the same
dichotomy lea pt from the first reading of the 1989 regulat ions.
';'33 T.C. 77 1 (1960), nonacq. Rev. Rul. 61-198, 1961-2 C.B.
(Part 2) 136, aff 'd per curiam, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961).
" See IRC se ct ion 355(a)(2)(A) ; Whitman , supra note 9, at
1209.
" 33 T.C. at 777-79.
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which supported the two-bus i ness requirement. 79 After
finding that the active trade or business requirement was
met, the majority readily found no device, since the two
feudi n g shareholders had no in terest in the other's postdistribution entity. The Coady majority probab ly rejected
the separate act ive bus iness rule because it was overinclusive, encompassing transactions that are not conducive to device. ao

The First Circuit ... took the opportunity to
attack, in dictum, the 1955 regulations ' prohibition of functional divisions of an integrated
business.

The Treasury's overreliance on the active business test
and its limitation of the device restriction to post-distribution sales opened up a gaping loopho le arising from
the underinclusive nature of the active business test. A
Coady-like vert ical division of a single actively conducted
business which was readi ly saleable could be accomplished w ithout tax even if the distribution was pro rata.
Taxpayers easily could meet the active business, business purpose, and continuity of interest tests and the
limited device restriction . This was arguab ly the result in
United States v. Marett,· ' which involved a pro rata
vertical division. Possibly recognizing the danger posed
by the Marett fact pattern-after a three-year wait, a postdivision corporation could be sold to effect a bailout- the
Service acquiesced in 1964 to Coady and Marett, announcing the future revision of section 355 regulations. 82
b . Whitman's Visi o n and th e Rafferty Resp onse. The
Service's delay in this revision invited critical commentarY, 83 but permitted further incremental development of
rules through letter and publ ic rulings . This process
constitutes an inherent advantage to agency "rule
making" as contrasted with legislative or even j udicial-

" Compare 33 T.C. at 776-779 with 783-84 . See generally
Whitman , supra note 9, at 1212-12 and n. 92 and 1214 n. 99
(Coady majority properly " fudged " the separate business issue
with "shady use" of legislative history) .
" Whitman, supra note 9, at 1214.
· '325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963). Twenty years ago, Professor
Peter Weidenbruch taught me in the LLM program at Georgetown
Law Center about this unwarranted extension tendency of the
(tax) case law, which I have since traced in other tax law
contexts. See, e.g., Lee & Bader, "Contingent Income Items and
Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions : Correlative Adjustments and
Clearer Reflection of Income: ' 12 J. Corp. L. 137-207 and n. 439
(1987) . He also led us through the 1955 regulations with problems
and via his syllabus introduced me to the significance, and often
richn ess, of secondary tax literature. What more could you ask
of a teacher and mentor?
·' Rev. Rul. 64-147 , 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136.
·' The following secondary authorities strongly shaped my
article on Rafferty. supra note 30: Whitman , supra note 8.
Jacobs, "The Anatomy of a Spin-Off, " 1967 Duke l. J. 1; Massee.
supra note 50; Biltker & Eustice, "Federal Taxat ion of Corporations and Shareholders" (2d ed . 1966)
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line draw ing. according to Professor Davis '"4 Whitman.
fo cus i ng on the rule-standard dichotomy - wh ich he articulat e d a s definitional (active business) versus transact iona l (d ev ice) provisions" -advocated diminishing the
rol e o f th e active bu s iness test as well as the business
purpose and continuity of interest. Whitman argued that
th e d evice res triction should be a standard, t o be used for
d e te rmining whether the transaction was worthy of tax
d eferra l,
The Tax Co urt in Rafferty had found no active business, B6 Th e First Circuit agreed. but took th e opportunity
to attack, in dictum, th e 1955 regulations' prohibition of
functiona l divisions of an integra t ed business ."' The co urt
ad o pt ed a functional standard for defining active busin ess, The " corporation must engage in entrep ren eurial
e nd eavo rs of such a nature and to such an extent as to
qua lit a tiv e l y distinguish its operations fr om mere investments, Moreo ver , ther e should be objective i n dicia of
such corporate operations ."88 In 1975 , the Service announce d that it would fo ll ow Rafferty , and approved
functional div is ions of an integrated business ,B9
c . The 1977 Proposed Amendments. In 1977 Trea s ury proposed extensive revisions to the sect ion 355
regu lati o n s . Th e 1977 propo sed regulations w ere a major
st e p in the e volution from ru les to structured discretion
through standards implemented with a ru le-standard
fusion , Th e Prea mble announced two major changes
from 1955 reg ulatio n s: (1) revision of the device provision
" to d esc rib e factor s which are to b e tak en int o account in
making th e determination of whether a transaction was a
'device' ," and (2) revi si on of the ac t ive bus iness rule to
provid e for th e separation of a s ing le business consistent
with Coady and Marett ,90 eliminating the ir ove rin clus ive
featur e. Th e revisions adopted much of the sp i rit o f the
Rafferty- Whitman approach , albeit not the letter of the
cases. For instance, the propos ed revisions reordered the
rules, placing bu s in ess purpose and continuity of interest
first and device second ahead of the active business rules
in th e regulatio n s 91 (Thi s order is maintained in th e 1989
final revis ions of th e sec ti on 355 regulations 92 )
Thi s impli cit downgrad ing of the act ive busin es s test in
th e ordering of the re gulation provisions i s borne out by
the liberali zation regarding functio nal div isions under the
active b us in ess tes t. Th e drafters ex p li ci tly relied on th e

" Dav is, supra not e 11 . at 16, 60, and 219, and 38-39 ,
"' Whit ma n. su pra note 8, at 121 1, see also id. at 12 15- 16, 1227,
1252-53.
'655 T ,C, 490, 499 (1970) . aff'd on ocher grounds, 452 F.2d 767
(1st Cir , 1971) , cer /, denied 408 U.S. 922 (1972)
" 452 F.2d at 772 nn, 10 and 12. See generally Lee , supra , 27
Tax L Rev. at 457 - 58, 473.
"' 452 F.2d at 772-73; see generally Lee , supra, 27b Tax L Rev ,
at 462-66.
" Rev , Rul . 75 - 160, 1975- 1 G.B . 11 2. To my sa d ex perience. I
discove red sho rtl y th ereaf te r that they would not rul e on a propo sed pro rata se paration of owner- occup ied rea l es ta te w ith a
co ntinued rela tion ship with th e light manufacturing co rporation
in whi ch employees could inve st after t he pro po sed di vis ion ,
Who but Professor Mar tin Gin sburg wo uld have tllOUght of
alphabet or 's ubsidi ary tracking" stock as a better solution?
90Preamble , 42 Fed . Reg 2694 (Jan , 1977)
" See note 57 , su pra, and accom panying text.
''' 'See note 63, supra,
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related funct io n test of an enhanced device re s tric t ion, "
Thi s shift fr om active bus in ess to d ev ice was n ol exte nded
to owner-occupied realty , where th e drafte rs' chief wor ry
was " net- leasing .""' T h e active business tes t also imp liCit ly
adopted a Rafferty-d e rived functi o nal definition of "S ign ificant operational and manag e ment services .""" Whil e the
1977 proposa ls provid e d num erou s active bu s iness exam ple s, sometimes reversing the 1955 example s, all 100
ofte n the exa mples gave cryptic s ignals without genera liz ations in the tex p 6
d. The Active Business Test: 1989 Version. Th e 1989
revised regulations ' treatment of th e active bu s iness test
essentia ll y fol low the bas ic thru s t of the 1977 proposals,
The final regulations permit both vertical "' and horizonta l
division s , subject ing th e latter to th e r e lated fun c ti o n rule
of the dev ice provi sions .98

The new regulations also address the troublesome issue of corporate expansion upon which
the case law had split.

Fortunatel y, th e final revi se d regu lation s address a
number of active busin ess iss ues whi ch th e 1977 proposa ls fai led to cons ider For exa mpl e, in 8 cco rdancc
with ear lier ruling s, th e 1989 re vi sio ns re quire t he corpo ration itself generally to perform active and subs tanti al
manage ment and operat ional functi ons .9" Th e new I'egula-

9J Compa re Prop, Treas . r g. sec tio n 1.355-2(c)(3)( lv) I idst Iwo
sen tences) and id. sec ti on 1355-3(c) Ex s. (8). (9), an d ( 1~ 1 With
Treas . reg sec tion 1. 355 - 1(c) Ex s. (5) , (11), (12),and (16) ( 19551 .
See generally Lee , " Pr oposed Reg s, Under 355 Overhau l /)ev ;cc
Tes t and Singl e Bu siness Divi sions ," 46 J . Tax . 194 , 195 - 96 .1 98
·'Prop . Treas. reg, sections 1,355-3(b)(2)(i ii) (B) and 31c) Exs .
(4 ), (5), and (13) (1977); see Lee, supra, 46 J . 1 ax ,11 198
(sug gest ing more focu s on device- re lated function) .
·'Prop . Treas . reg , sect ion 1,355-3(b)(2)(i ii) .
· · See Lee. supra 46 J , Tax . at 198- 99 , Helfand & Lalv lng ,
" Fi ll ing th e Serbonian Bog with Qui cksan d- Propose d Secti on
355 Regulat io ns Further Ob sc ure Corporate Separati o ns, Par t
3," 6 J . Corp. Ta x'n. 133, 141 - 42 , 146-52 (1979) (" Helf and &
Lavfing (part 3) " ).
" Preamb le, supra , 54 Fed . Reg . 288; T reas, reg , sectio n 1 .35 ~ 3(b)(3)(i) (1989)
' Bld. se ct ion 1.355- 3(c) Exs. (9), (10), and (11) (1989) , Nole In
exa mpl es cross references (a) to regu lation provis ion cit ed in n
97 , supra , and (b) to " related fu nction " com pon ent o f the
re gu lations devi ce test. Note th at the examp les invo lving separ ation of partially owned-occup ied rea l estate do not fo llow ttl is
appr oac h; id. Exs. (12) and (13) . Indeed, the Servic e forthrrghtl y
ac knowl edges in Exmaple 13 th at the exam ple " does not address " whether pre-separation activiti es as to a bu ild ing 175
pe rc ent owner-use in business and 25 percent leas ed as sto rage
to another perso n) wou ld constitute th e ac tive conduct o f a
t rade or business during the five-yea r lookback . Su ch o penn ess
co nst itute s a quantu m leap over th e earl ier tec hniq ue o f drafti ng
ex amp les by innuendo,
99Tr eas, reg , section 1.355-3(b)(iii) (1989) See Lee, supra 46
J. Tax at 199; Lee, " Th e 'Act ive Bus iness' Test of Sec ti on 355
Impl ications o f a Trilogy of Revenue RU li ngs ," 31 WaSh, & Lee L.
Rev. 251 (1974 ).
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tions also address the troublesome issue of corporate
expansion upon which the case law had split.' oo The regulatio n drafters c ho se the more liberal and administrabl e
approach , as expla ined in the Preamble . '0 '
Th e drafters chose th e rule that purchase , creation , or
other acquis it io n of anot her trade or bu siness in the sa m e
line as an existi ng trade or business is treated as an
expansion o f the origina l business unless this purchase ,
creation , or other acquisition affects such a change of
character as to constitute the acqu isiti on of a new or
different business w2 The active business examples were
revised to ref lect this change and to flesh out the generali zat ion in text. ' 03 Mo reover, the excellent preamble to the
revised regu lations spells out the reasoning under ly in g
th e examples ,'o. a welcome development in regulation
drafting.
Following the structured discretion shown in the revised
regulations, the 1989 regulat ions also properly point out
that the separation of owner-occupied real estate will be
subject to care ful scrutiny under the act ive business
requirement s because this separation, although it could
satisfy the active business requirement, presents significant tax avoidance opportunities. '05 Even if this separation
survives special scrutiny under the active bus iness test,
th e pream ble and the reg ulations point out th at it may be
subject to close examination under the related function
device test where the rea l estate continues to be occupied
by the previous owner. 106 The Preamble also mentions,
but does not resolve, other longstanding problems raised
by the distribution of an entity holding owner-occupied
real estate . 107
The active business provisions of the 1955 regu lations,
the 1977 proposed amendments , and the 1989 revised
regulation s all have made commendable and progressively more so phi sticated use of examples in illustrating
the general p rinc ip les. There has been a welcome evolu tion in explanation of the general pri nc iples beh ind the

examples; factual patterns are distinguished , and unanswered questions are noted .
3. Device Restriction
a. The 1955 Version and Criticism. Th e 1955 regulations focused the search for device on post-distribution
sales, articulating confusing distinctions based on
whether the sa le was arranged prior to the corporate
separat ion. loa Whil e they stated that particular consideration would be given in applying a facls-and-circumstances
device test to the nature, kind, and amount of assets, the
only guidance that the 1955 regulatio ns provided was a
positive implication of no device where substantially all
t he assets of the post-division corporations had been
used ina five-year active busi ness. '0 9 The Service i nterpreted the device test as a dividend equivalency test , thus
providing a safe harbor for substa ntially non pro rata
division s. li D

In Rafferty v. Commissioner, ... the . .. transac tion clearly [was] not worthy of tax deferral.

Whitman criticized this diminution of device. He advo cated that the device restriction be raised to a standard ,
asking whether the transaction was worthy of tax deferral.
In Rafferty v. Commissioner,' " the First Circuit seized the
opportunity to approve Whitma n's proposals in a tran saction clearly not worthy of tax def erra l. There, the pro rata
division was motivated by the sole shareholder's estate
planning motives at best, and placed readi ly saleable real
estate (he ld in a corporation) in the shareholder's hands.
Th is real estate was net leased to a related corporation,
so the tran saction failed th e active business test as
wel 1. 1I2 The First Circuit may have felt provoked by th e
Tax Co urt's opinion , which in part exactly paralleled the
Treasury approach criticized by Whi t man . For the Tax
Court in Rafferty, like the Service in general at that time ,
had devalued the device test by finding it satisfied by an
adeq uate (shareho ld er-le vel) business purpose for the

'O OCompare Lockwood's Es tate v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712
1965), with Nielsen v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 311
(1973) . See genera lly, Halfand & Lafving , Part 3, supra note 96,

(8th Ci r.

at 140-43.
lO' [I]n reexa mining the active business requirement , Treasury
and the In ternal Revenue Service recognized that it is often
diffic ult to determine wh ether a corporation is conducting a
si ngle busin ess , which may be separated under section 355 if it
has been active ly conducted for five years, or multiple businesses, which may be separated from eac h other under sect ion
355 only if each has been actively conducted for five years .
Correlatively. th ey recogn ized that it is difficult to determine
wh ether a corpo rate expenditure for a new activity const itutes a
new business or th e ex pan sion of an existing business. Accord ingly, it is cons id ered appropriate to sim plify these determ inations. Preambl e, supra, 54 Fed . Reg . at 288.
'O'Treas. reg . section 1.355-3(b)(3)(ii) (1989) .
IO' /d. secti on 1.355-3(c) Exs . (7) and (8) .
IO'Preamble, supra, 54 Fed . Reg . at 288 ("same bus iness
principle applies regardless of wh ether (a) old and new components operated as sing le unit, and (b) new component resul ted
from interna l expansion or purchase as a going concern) . See
Lee, supra , 46 J . Tax. at 199, for implications of 1977 examples.
,o' /d. at 288; see Schneider, supra note 37, at 592 , n. 141 .
'o·Preamble. supra, 54 Fed . Reg . at 288.
\oT/d. at 289, Treas. reg . section 1.355-3(c) (Ex. (13) (1989) (l ast
sentence) .
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I08Treas. reg. secti on 1.355-2(b)(2) (1955) ; Lee, supra , 27 Tax
L. Rev. at 474 n. 82.

''"Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(b)(3) (1955); Lee, supra. 27 Tax
L. Rev . at 475-76.
" OSee , e.g., Rev. Ru!. 71 -593, 1971 -2 C.B. 181 ; Rev. Ru!. 64102, 1964-1 C.B. (Pa rt 1) 136).
"' 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922
(1972) .
' ''In my view, the creative use of dictu m to resolve issues
raise d in the commentary , albe it not on the facts, here just as in
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), is
good opinion writing . At least as to Hillsboro, Professor Blum
disagrees. Blum , "The Ro le of the Supreme Court in Federal Income Tax Controversies : Hil lsboro National Ban k and Bliss
Dairy, Inc.," 6 Taxes 363.368 (1983) .
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corporate separatio n." 3 Instead, the Tax Court relied on
the active business test, properly finding no active business.
The First Circuit cited "the rule that the taxpay er has
the burden of proving that the transaction was not used
principally as device"-Whitman's catch ph rase for elevating the device restriction to a standard.'" In implementing this standard, the court formulated a balancing
framework for determining whether the transaction is
worthy of tax deferral : if (1) a transaction has consi derable
potential for use as a device by placing readily saleab le
assets in an entity, and (2) sale of this entity or its assets
would not impair the shareholder's control over the other
continuing business entity, then (3) the taxpayer must
show either that the shareholder's motives were germane
to the continuance of the corporate business, or were a
direct benefit to the business of the original corporation ." 5
The Rafferty court preferred "this approach over reliance
upon formulations such as 'business purpose,' and 'active
business,' '' citing Whitman, who had called for just this
rearrangement of the section 355 factors .116

The failure to rank the various factors relating
to device was the most grev;ous defect of the
1977 proposals.

Rafferty's fleshing out of the device standard significantly does not entail detailed, per se rules . Some of the
factors - particularly saleability of assets and impairment
of equity- speak direct ly to the underlying standard of
preventing bailouts ." 7 The balancing between bailou t
potential and shareholder or business purposes outweighing this potential (by requiring retention of the
assets) is more standard-oriented than rule-oriented. In
effect, Rafferty provided framew ork for structured justice.
b. The 1977 Device Proposals. The device provisions
in the 1977 proposed regulations used a mixture of p er se
and balancing factors . Prearranged subsequent sales of
more than a specified percentage of the distributed stock
constituted a device per 5e." 8 Apparently , either a pro
rata distribution or the presence of assets used in a

"'55 T.C. 490. 496. But after finding no active business as to
the spun-off real estate corporation, the Tax Court inconsistently, but correctly. concluded that the shareholder "extracted
through an attempted tax-free spin-off what are in su bstance
passive, investment-type assets. This transaction is a 'bailout' of
the earnings and profits . . . and to this extent constitutes a
'device' . . . . ," Citing Whitman. 55 T.C . at 500.
"'Compare Rafferty. 452 F.2d at 769, with Whitman . supra
note 8, at 1253.
"' See generally Lee. " Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 Atter Rafferty." 27 Tax L.
Rev. 453. 489-90 , 492-93, and 496 (1972) ; accord, Helfand &
Lafving (Part 3). supra note 96, at 153.
"6452 F.2d at 770.
'" See Lee, supra, 27 Tax L. Rev . at 480-86.
"3Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(c)(2) (1977) (if prearranged
sale of 20 percent or more of stock distributed " will be considered
to have been used principally as a device") .
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related function constituted evidence of device"9 Two
examples accompanied the 1977 device proposals . One
was a simple prearranged sale of a 50 percent interest.
The other featured a sale preceded by a distribution of
excess cash that outweig hed a corporate business pu rpose . These examples appeared without applicable generalizations in text. '20
The 1977 proposed amendments neither considered
the standard of impairment of equity ca(led for in Rafferty
nor addressed several other troublesome areas.'2' From
the perspective of structured discretion , the failure to
rank the various factors relating to device was the most
grievous defect of the 1977 proposals .In Nevertheless,
they were a commendable first step.'2J At the time,
however, commentators were irritated by the 13-year
delay between the promise first of revision and the arrival
of revision of the 1955 active business regulation and the
1977 proposed revisions.124

C. Device: 1989 Style
The new regulations adopt an "all of the facts and
circumstances" test for the device standard . This is
augmented by the required balancing of "device factors"
with " non-device factors," which in turn is subject to an
overriding , detailed exception for nondividend equivalent
transactions . There is an exception to the exceptio n if
bailout is still facilitated . This is structured discretion. '25
Furthermore, each set of factors and the nondividend
equivalent exception contains internal balancing tests
that re late back to the device standard . ,26 Add itionally,
the new regulations instruct the decision make r to give
shifting weight to certa i n factors according to va riations
in factual patterns within the particular category of factors
and to shift the balance between the factors themselves .127
Particular "hot buttons," like owner-occupied real estate, '28 are isolated for particular scrutiny , instead of
being the overarching concerns that had impaired the
efficacy of earlier regulations. 129
1. Device Factors. The 1989 regulations contain three
device factors : (a) pro rata distribution, (b) a subsequent
sale or exchange of stock, and (c) the nature and use of
assets. '30 These factors w ere present in the 1977 proposed revisions, but the taint of a pro rata distr ibution
was not clearly stated. However, the 1977 proposed
regulations had a 20 percent ceiling on the percentage of
distributed stock that could be sold in a prearranged sa le

1I9Prop. Treas . reg . sections 1.355-2(c)(1) and (3) .
"Old. section 1.355-2(c)(4) .
"' Lee, supra, 46 J . Tax . at 200.
'22Helfand & Latving, " Filling the Serbonian Bog with Quick-

sand: Proposed Section 355 Regulations Further Obscure Corporate Separations - Part 1," 5 J . Corp. Tax 345 , 354, 367-68. 371
(1979) .
'23Lee. supra , 46 J. Tax. at 200.
" 'Id.

"'See text accompanying note 11 , supra.
'26Treas . reg . sections 1.355-2(d)(ii) , (iv)(c) , and (5)(i) (1989) .
I27See note 66, supra .
123
1 surmise that the importance given to the active business
tests and especially the preeminence given the two-business requirement of the 1955 regulations were directed at a blanket
denial of section 355 to owner-occupied real estate.
'29See Preamble. supra, 54 Fed. Reg . at 288, note 73, supra .
" oTreas. reg . section 1.355-2(d) (1989) .
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without automatically invoking the device restriction . 131 A
prearranged sale of less than 20 percent of the stock or of
secu rities was "s u bstantial evidence" of use as a device.
Sa les that were not prearranged were to be taken into
account with other evidence in determining whether the
transaction was used pr inc ipal ly as a device. 132 The final
regulation s delete this per se ru le, treating any prearra nged sale as sUbstantial evidence of a device .133 In a
quantum improveme nt in regulation drafting , the regu lations vary th e weight of evidence of device attri butable to
a subsequent sale as follows:
Generally , the greater the percentage of the stock
sold or exchanged after the distribution, the
stronger the evidence of device. In addition , the
shorter the period of ti me between the distri bution
and the sale or exchange , the stronger the evidence
of device. 134
On a technical level , the drafters of the 1989 regulations
devoted more careful attention to post-distri bution sales
of securities and "boot" dividends. They except these
sa les from treatment as evidence of a device, since
neither is amenab le to a bailout due to the ordinary income treatment under section 356. '35

The final regulations ... treat . .. any prearranged sale as substantial evidence of a device.

The 1989 revisions increase the sophistication of the
nature and use of assets factors from the 1977 proposals
and th e 1955 regulations by taking account of the Service's ruli ng experie nce and the adv ice of commenters .1J6
The " nature, kind , and amount of the assets" test for a
device in the 1955 regu lations focused on satisfact ion of
th e active busi ness test as evidence that the transact ion
was not used principally as a device. m The 1977 proposed regu lations focused on the presence of recently
purchased assets or liquid assets . A device was indicated
if a substantial portion of the assets of any post-distribution corporation consisted of trade or bus iness assets
acquired in a cost basis transaction within the preceding
five-year period , or there was a transfer or retention of
cash or li quid assets unrelated to the reasonable needs of
the bu si ness.' 38 T he 1989 revisions coalesce these two
tests into one dev ice factor. The presence of assets that
are not used in a trade or bus iness that satisfies the fiveyear predistribut ion active conduct requirement of section 355(d) - inc ludi ng cash and ot her liqui d assets not

related to the reaso nab le needs of the busi ness - is evidence of device. '39
III ustrating more sophisticated balanci ng , the 1989
regulations provide that the strength of the evidence of
device depends on all facts and circumstances, includ ing
each postdistribution corporation 's ratio of value of assets
not used in any trade or business to the va lue of assets
that meet the five-year active business requirement. '40
Drawing upon ruling experience, as advocated by Professor Davis as to administrative rules in general , the 1989
regulations state that a difference in this ratio ordinarily
is not evidence of device if the distribution is not pro rata
and this difference is attributable to a need to equal ize
the va lue of the stock distri buted and the stock surrendered by the distributees .14 '
The 1977 proposals and the 1989 revised regu lations
both include under the nature and use of assets factor the
presence of a continuing " related function " between the
distributed corporation and the parent corporation. "2
The new regulations use the term " secondary business"
for a post-distribution business with a conti nuing prinCipal
function of serving th e other post- d ivision business or an
affiliate. This approach was Treasury's answer to the
probl ems it saw in functional divisions previously barred
by the now-abandoned separate active business require ment. The related function test , particularly as revised in
the final regulations, is closely related to the bailout
problem . The new version of the related function test
properly provides that there is no device if sale of the
"seco ndary business" would adversely affect the busi ness of the other corporation . 143 This, of course , is the
impairm ent of equity test dictated by Rafferty'"
2. Non-Device Factors. Following the suggestion of
commenters on the 1977 proposed revis ions , the government agreed that the corporate business purpose for a
transaction cou ld outweig h the evidence of device presented by the transaction ."5 Rafferty mandated this approach . The 1989 regulations guide the decision maker's
disc retion in an innovative way.
The fina l regulations adopt a sl iding scale approach .
Thus, the greater the evidence of device, the
stronger the corporate business purpose necessary
to outweigh that evidence. ,46
Further examples of the structured discretion employed
throughout the 1989 revis ions are contained in the non-

'39Treas . reg . section 1.355-2(d}(iv}(8) (1989).

"O ld. section 1.355-2(d}(2)( iv)(8) (1989) .
''' Id.; Prea mble , supra , 54 Fed. Reg. at 286. See Rev. Ru!. 64-

'" Prop. Treas. reg . sec ti on 1.355- 2(c}(2} (1977).
"' Id.
'''Treas. reg . sect ion 1.355- 2(d}(2}(iii)(8} (1989).
"' Id. section 1.355-2(d)(2}(ii i}(A} .
"' Preamble, supra , 54 Fed . Reg . at 285; Treas. reg. section
1.355-2(d}(iii}(E} (last sentence).
"·Preamble , supra , 54 Fed. Reg . at 286, Citing both sources.
J37 Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(b}(3) (1955) .
'''Prop. Treas. reg. sections 1.355- 2(c)(3)(ii) and (iii) (1977).
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102, 1964-1 C .B. 137; Rev . Ru!. 71-383, 1971-2 C .B. 180.
"' Compare Prop . Treas. reg . section 1.355-2 (c}(3}(iv) (1977)
with Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv}(C) (1989) .
''' Id. sect ion 1.355-2(d)(2) (iv)(C) (clause (i ) of the first se ntence) .
'''Preamble, supra, 54 Fed . Reg . at 286. In theory, the same
impairment of equity defense shoul d app ly to the other two
device factors : po st -distribution sales and non-section 355(b)
assets, except excess liquid assets . See Lee , supra, 46 J . Tax . at
197, 200; Lee, supra , 27 Tax L. Rev . at 48 1-86.
"' Pream ble , supra , 54 Fed . Reg . at 283 and 287 : Treas. reg .
section 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii) (1989) .
"'Preamble, 54 Fed . ReQ . at 287.
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exclusive list of factors provided for assessing the strength
of a corporate business purpose. 147 They establish "that
not just any cooked up, last minute business purpose is
enough ."" s
The revised regu lations also include as a nondevice
factor the fact that the distributing corporation is publicly
traded with no shareholder owning more than five percent
of any class of stock.'49 This per se rule avoids the
difficulty, exposed in Golconda Mining, of determining
whether a shareholder or group of shareholders in a
publicly traded corporation controls it. 'sO This is the apparent standard under the accumulated earnings tax for
determining whether the shareholders in a public corporation caused it to accumulate income rather than paying
dividends' s,
Commentators on the proposed 1977 revisions pOinted
out that due to the dividends received deduction applicable to intercorporate dividends, a distribution of stock
in the controlled corporation to one or more domestic
corporations would not pose a bailout opportunity (at
least to the extent of the deduction). 152 The government
apparently agreed by treating corporate ownership as
not evidence of a device. '53

'''Treas. reg . sections 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii)(A), (B), and (C) (1989)
(importance; extent prompted by outsiders or outside, uncontro llable factors ; and immed iacy) .
'''Sheppard , " Section 355 Regulations Do Not Prevent Aggressive Transaciions," 42 Tax Notes 274 (January 16, 1989). Within
a week after publication , an IRS National Office Corporate
Reorganization attorney used the term " not just any cooked-up
busines s purpose" in a telephone conversation with me . He
shared th e story of the National Office asking the taxpayer's
attorney for an affidavit that a key employee really wanted to buy
stock in a post-distribution corporation and being told that the
attorney would obtain it immediately . How could the attorney be
so sure? "He'll sign it or we'll fire him," the attorney replied .
'49Treas . reg . section 1.355- 2(d)(3)(iii) (1989) .
" oThe Tax Court in Golconda Mining Corp, v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 139, 158 (1972), fashioned the standard for " neutra lizing"
publ ic ownership as to whether the company was managed to
accumulated income to avoid paying dividends.
If the management group is dominated by a single large
shareholder or a small group of shareholders who exercise
effective control over the dividend policy of the company
or the company represents itself to prospective or existing
shareholders as an investment company with the avowed
policy of accumulating its investment income, public
ownership of the company becomes a less important
factor in determining whether earnings and profits had
been accumulated for the proscribed purpose. Id.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the factual bas is
that shareholders who at most owned 17 percent of the stock
(between 1,500 and 2,900 sharehol ders owned stock during the
year) did not exercise such control. 507 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir.
1974) . In Rev. Rul. 75-305, 1975-2 C.B. 228, the Service an nounced it would not follow the Ninth Circuit's opinion .
"' Since 1984, section 532(c) has provided that publiC stock
holding alone does not exempt a corporation from the accumu lated earnings tax . The intended test is whether any " individual
or small group of individuals has legal or effective control of the
corpo ration ," Joint Comm . Staff , General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, H .R. 4170 ,
98th Cong ., 2d Sess. 164 (1984) (" 1984 Bluebook").
"2Helfand & Lafving, Part 3, supra note 96, at 372.
'''Treas. reg . section 1.355-2( d)(3)(iv) (1989) .
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The device portion of the 1989 regulations provides
four much more helpful examples than the 1977 proposals. The examples weigh various device factors against
varying degrees of the corporate business purpose as a
nondevice factor, illustrating various aspects of the business purpose factor. '54 Moreover, each example refers to
subsections in the text of the regulation containing the
relevant generalizations . The Preamble culls and explains
the determinative facts of each example and the weighing
process .'ss No more cryptic examples here. Incidentally,
some of the most commonly asserted business purposes
are properly blown away, for example, sales to "valued"
employees of a smaller post-division corporation. Under
the nontaxable alternative rule, ' 56 other means of compensation, such as stock appreCiation rights or perhaps
compensatory alphabet stock of the parent, theoretically
might even preclude a tax-free division based upon
separat ing out the company employing the key employee
in order to issue her new stock.' 57
3. Safe and Relatively Safe Harbors. The Service indicated in early rulings that it considered the device restriction merely a dividend equivalency test.' 58 If, in the
absence of section 355, the transaction would have been
taxable as capital gain to the distributee shareholder
under section 302(a) , the distribution did not violate the
device restriction . The Service extended the same reasoning to transactions in which the distributing corporation
and the controlled or separated corporation did not have
earnings and profits. '59 Whitman criticized the Service for
abdicating its power to police bailouts by so limiting the
device test. He reasoned that the Service diminished the
importance of device in order to rely on the familiar
reorganization judicial doctrines like business purpose
and, implicitly, the active business test. 'SO It is more likely
that the Service wanted to limit section 355 deferral to
non pro rata distributions and separations in which the
shareholders in each post-distribution corporation had
no interest in the other corporation . A section 302(b)(3)
dividend equivalency test seemed to do that nicely.

The Service indicated In early rulings that it
considered the device restriction merely a dividend equivalency test.

The 1977 proposed regulations incorporated the described ruling experience of the Service, providing that if
a distribution to each distributee would have been treated

"' Id. section 1.355- 2(d)(4) .
'55Preamble , supra , 52 Fed . Reg . at 287 .
' 56 1d, at 285; Treas. reg . sect ion 1.355-2(b)(3) (1989) (second
sentence) .
'''Sheppard, "Section 355 Regulations," supra note 148, at
274. Others disagree. See Wood, " Do the Section 355 Regulations
Go That Far? ," 43 Tax Notes 225 (April 10, 1989) . Sheppard has
further explicated her pOSition , with which I agree, in Sheppard,
" Section 355 and BUSiness Purpose, " 43 Tax Notes 794 (May 15,
1989) .
"·See note 72, supra; accord Rev. Rul. 71-383, 1971 - 2 C.B .
180.
'59Rev. Rul. 71-384, 1971-2 C.B . 181 .
160 S e e note 72, supra.
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as a redemption under section 302(a) if it were taxable,
"the transaction is ordinarily not considered to be a
device for the distribution of earnings and profits. "'6'
Similarly , the 1977 proposals stated that if neither the
distributing corporation nor the controlled corporation
had earnings and profits at the time of the distribution,
the transaction was ordinarily not considered a device.'62
The interrelationship of this rule with the device restriction
was not clear. '63

The exception which arises when there are no
earnings and profits ... Is not available to a
distributing corporation with built-in gains.

The 1989 final regulations make nondividend equivalency a superfactor that ordinarily outweighs-as suggested by commentators '64-any device factors in a per
S9 manner. The rationale is that the three specified
nondividend equivalent distributions ordinarily do not
present a potential for tax avoidance. '65 The favored three
consist of (1) no earnings and profits in the distributing
or controlled corporations, (2) a transaction to wh ich
section 302(a) would apply if the transaction were taxable,
and (3) a transact ion to which section 303(a) would apply
if taxable .'66 The new regulations properly lift the protection of the hypothetical section 302(a) and section 303
redemption exceptions if (a) stock in more than one
controlled corporation is distributed , and (b) the transaction " facilitates the avoidance of the dividend provisions
of the Code through the subsequent sale or exchange of
stock of one corporation and the retention of the stock of
another corporation." '67 This distribution of a sister corporation exception to the stock exception is a sound
innovation . The regulations also soundly limit the exception which arises when there are no earnings and profits.
It is not avai lable to a distributing corporation with builtin gains. ' 68
As a matter of substantive policy. however. the government may still have been too permissive regarding the
hypothetical redemption transactions. Certainty comes
at a price. The addition of section 303 indicates that the
drafters' attention was focused on capital gains treatment
and not on any continuing ability of a shareho lder to
withdraw income without impairing her equity in the
retained business. In a hypothetical section 302(b)(3)
"complete termination of interest" distribution of stock in
a single controlled corporation. a bailout without impairment of equity by definition cannot arise. However, the
hypothetical redemption cou ld qualify as a "substantially
disproportionate" redemption under section 302(b)(2) . A

" 'Prop. T reas. reg. section 1.355-2(c)(1) (1977).
"' Id.
I·JSee Helfand & Lafving. Part 3. supra note 96.
'·· Preamble. supra. 54 Fed. Reg. at 287.
1·'Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(5)(i) (1989).
"·'d. sec tion s 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii). (iii) . and (iv) .
1·' ld. sec tion 1.355-2 (d)(5)(i) (last sentence ).
'''' Id. section 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii)(C).
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less-than-5D-percent shareholder in the post- distribution
corporation could retain an interest in the distributing
corporation which was reduced only 20 percent (say
from 50 percent to 40 percent) and receive a 100 percent
interest in the controlled corporation which could even
continue to do business with the distributing corporat ion .
A section 303(a) transaction presents an even greater
bailout opportunity since the distribution could be completely pro rata and involve a related function . In short.
section 303 is an unsuitable gauge of dividend equivalency.
A safe harbor for a partial liquidation under section
302(b)(4) is not available here because it requires distri bution of either five-year active business assets that are
not in corporate form or the proceeds from sale of these
assets. Distribution of stock in a controlled corporation .
therefore, cannot qualify as a partial liquidation under
section 302(b)(4)' 69 and. hence, cannot qualify under section 302(a) . Congress must have intended this result
because in a partial liquidating distribution (whiCh may
be pro rata) of five-year active business assets or the
proceeds of their sale automatically satisfies the special
dividend equivalency test under sections 302(e)(1 )(A)
and (2)(A) . Thus, the hypothetical redemption exception
should not be ava ilabl e to a hypothet ical partial liquidation. A published ruling to that effect would be helpful .

Section 303 is an unsuitable gauge of dividend
equivalency.

The 1989 regulations accompany this new provIsion
with only two examples . The first is a balancing example
from the device-nondevice factor portion of the regulations (with excessive cash in a pro rata division tipping
the scale to device) with the additional determ i native
factor of no earnings and profits Y o The second example
illustrates the exception to the hypothetical section 302(a)
redemption for distributions of two (or more) corporations
which could facilitate a subsequent bailout. The sparseness of examples in the regulations might represent
some relative discomfort on the part of Treasury or the
Service with these safe harbors rather than their newness.
since dividend equivalency had long been a favored
Service test for device.
4. Business Purpose. The three major business purpose section 355 issues since Whitman wrote have been
whether (a) in a tax-free division a business purpose
could outweigh device factors , for example. ready saleability; (b) a business purpose test must be met independently whether device potential exists. for example. a
completely non pro rata division due to hostility between
equal shareholders; and (c) shareholder business purpose
alone could sufficeY' The 1989 version of the business
purpose requirement for purposes of section 355 addresses all of these questions as well as a number of

1·' Morg enstern v. Commissioner. 56 T.C. 44 (1971) .
17°Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(d)(5)(ji) (1989).
171 See , e.g., Wh it man , supra note 9, at 1245-5 1.
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other troubling issues not dealt with in the 1955 regulations or the 1977 proposals.
The introduction into the 1989 regulations of business
purpose as a counterbalancing nondevice factor is discussed above. Turning to bus iness purpose as an independent requirement , Whitman showed that the congressiona l purpose in adding the device language to the 1939
Code was to head off judicial glosses on the revenue
statute. Business purpose and continuity of interest had
arisen in just th is fashion. Whitman also opposed the
government's reliance on the business purpose and conti nuity of interest doctrines under section 355 as well as
its even heavier reliance on the active business test. He
saw th is reliance as the result of the Service's eq uation of
device with d ividend equivalency. '72 The First Circuit in
Rafferty found Whitman's argument convincing . The Ninth
Circuit's hOlding in Commissioner v. Wilson seemed to
require the retention of the 1955 business purpose criterion as an independent test in subsequent versions of
the regu lations.173 The reasoning and examples in the
1989 revised regu lations and Professo r Davis' concept of
"structured discretion" establish that the business purpose requirement should be independent of the device
test. This result seems proper.
Business purpose does, indeed , provide more discretion
to the courts and the Service in applying the regulations
in ruling requests as well as on audits. But Congress was
wrong in fearing that discretion in the context of section
355. Congress is slow to f ine-tune tax laws un less major
revenue loss or administrative irritants are invo lved , and
the administering agency needs tools to meet unanticipated developments. A broader standard is more likely to
provide those tools-business purpose here - than are
detailed rules . For instance, the Service apparently used
the business purpose test to thwart the use of section 355
to pare down a corporation with too many assets, shareholders , or controlled subsidiaries , which could not be
read ily liquidated into the parent , in order to satisfy one
or more of the 1986-1988 General Utilities' transition
rules, the section 355 number of shareholders ceiling , or
the affiliated group prohibition for S corporation elections. ' 74
As illustrated by an example in the 1989 regulations, an
independent business purpose test requires a corporate
business purpose other than saving Federa l income taxes
(for exam pie, by an S corporation election) or state ta xes
arising out of the same transaction amounting to less
than the Federal income taxes. 175 Such broader discretion
is needed in addition to the more structured discretion
under the device portion of the regu lations. Even here,
however, the discretion is not totally unstructured . Unfortunately, many taxpayers apparently made distributions
in order to elect S corporation status without requesting
rulings. 176

"'Whi tman , supra note 9, at 1235, 1239, 1241; accord. Lee,
supra, 27 Tax l. Rev. at 477.
"'353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965); see Lee, supra, 46 J. Tax . at 200;
Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. at 283.
17'See Sheppard. "Section 355 Regulat ions. " supra note 148 at
274; Simon & Simmons. "The Future of Section 355," 40 Tax
Notes 291 . 300 (July 18,1988).
"'Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. at 284; Treas . reg. sections 1.3552(b)(2) and 2(b)(5) Ex. (6) (1989).
17"1 was so informed in a telephone conversation with a
National Office reorganizations specialist.
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Following the 1955 regu lations' bare bones bus iness
purpose (and con ti nuity of interest) requirements, the
1977 proposed regulations provided for tax-free separation only if the distribution was carried out for purposes
"german e to the business of the corporations," but added
that "a shareholder purpose may be so nearly coex tensive
with corporate business purpose as to preclude any
distinction ." 177 Furthermore, the 1977 proposals conta in ed
four examples dealing with corporate business purpose
or its absence. Responding to comments, the government explained in the Preamb le llB that a coextensive
business purpose is acceptab le, and the new regulations
provide an example . A non pro rata division along business lines of a two-business corporation between equa l
shareholders was made so that each could devote fu lltime attention to one business, a move wh ich was expected to enhance the operations of both businesses.
This transact ion was carried out for a corporate busi ness
purpose (presumably enhancement of operations) " notwithstanding that it is also carried out in part for shareholder purposes ."179 Presumably, shareho lder disagreement about corporate operations also gives rise to a
corporate busi ness purpose.

An independent business purpose test requires
a corporate business purpose other than saving
Federal/ncome taxes . .. ,

The First Circuit's reasoning in Rafferty regarding
shareholder business purpose had not proceeded along
the lines of coextensive ness, but instead required that the
shareho lder purposes be "germa ne to the continuance of
the corporate business." '8o The court made an ob liq ue
reference to Whitman 's example of a corporation's dividing its automobile dealership and its real estate premises to protect the dealership from the so le shareholder's
ex-spouse. The sole shareholder pledged the stock in the
spun-off real estate corporat ion as security for alimo ny
payments and thus could not sell the spun-off corporation to outsiders, nor would he , i n Whitman 's view,
defau lt in effect selling the spun-off stock to the exspouse since she then would become his operating
corporation's lessor.'8' Whitman found no device potential
there, but the reasoning of the 1989 regulat ion example
would suggest that the shareholder purpose of keeping
the ex-spouse away from the automobile dealership also
served the corporate purpose of avoidance of dissension.
The 1977 proposals used an example to explain the requirement of a business purpose for the distribution of
the controlling stock interest i n a distributed subsidiary
as well as a business purpose for the formation of the

"' Prop. Treas. reg . section 2.355-2(b)(1) (1977).
178Preamble, supra. 54 Fed. Reg. at 284; see Helfand & Lafving,
"Filling the Serbonian Bog with Quicksand- Proposed Section
355 Regulations Further Obscure Corporate Separations-Part
2," 6 J . Corp . Tax . 53, 60-68 (1979) .
''"Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(b)(5) Ex. (2) (1989) .
,sORafferty. 452 F.2d at 770.
l SI Whitman , supra note 9, at 1242-43.
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subsidiary,l S2 The 1989 revised regulations continued
that example but added a further clarifying example, A
transaction in which the distribution served a business
purpose still does not qualify for tax deferral if it can be
accomplished by another tax-free transaction, as explained in the Preamble,ls3 The regulations state:
If a corporate business purpose can be achieved
through a nontaxable transaction that does not
involve the distri bution of stock of a controlled subsidiary and which is neither impractical nor unduly
expensive, then, , . the separation is not carried out
for that corporate business purpose. '8'
The 1989 regulations illustrate this principle at several
pOints. ISS This formulation of nontaxable alternatives to
the corporation divison in asseSSing business purpose is
preferable to the Rafferty approach of rejecting the taxpayer's proferred business purpose (shareholder estate
planning) because this pu rpose "could be fully satisfied
by a bailout of dividendS ." ls6 This could lead to a test of
whether the same result could be obtained by a taxable
alternative.

The reworking of the business purpose provisions contained In the 1989 regulations Is a
major accomplishment.

The reworking of the business purpose provIsions
contained in the 1989 regulations is a major accomplishment. Like the earlier versions, the final regulations
preserve independent business purpose requirement as a
standard to disqualify transactions that, though not ba ilouts, still do not merit tax deferral due to broader tax
policies. Examples of these policies include protecting
General Utilities repeal and its transition rule or preventing abuse in C to S conversions . Fortunately, the final
regulations address various issues raised by comments
on the 1977 proposals, other commentators , and the
Service's own ruling experience. They do so through
generalizations about policy, followed by carefully crafted
examples relating to the generalizations, 187 Regulation
drafting has been raised to an art form ,
5. Conllnulty of Interest. Continuity of interest, like
the business purpose doctrine, was judicially fashioned

18'Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(b)(2) Ex. (3) (1977),
"'Preamble. supra, 54 Fed , Reg , at 284 ,
"'Treas . reg . section 1,355-2(b)(3) (1989),
,s' See, e.g" id. sections 1.355-2(b)(5) Exs. (3), (4), and 2(c)(4)
Ex. (1) .
"' Rafferty, 452 F,2d at 771,
'"'Thus, the new regulations address more fully in text and
examples (1) mixture of Federa l income tax savings and non tax
savings motives, (2) shareholder motives, (3) availability of
alternate nontaxable, practicable arrangements, (4) use of bus iness purpose as a device defense, (5) balanc in g of device
factors and business purpose, and (6) further elaboration of
evidence of business purpose , For a discuss ion of rulings matrix
from which many of the 1989 generalizations and exa mples were
drawn, see Schneider, supra note 37, at 606-10.
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and only contained in bare bones fashion in the 1955
regu lations.'ss Whitman and the First Circuit in Rafferty
opposed Service reliance on the continuity of interest
doctrine since they viewed it as a concomitant of the
government's refusal to give form and substance to the
device restrict ion . 'S9 The 1977 proposal neither added
examples nor amplified the mere statement that the
continuity of interest doctrine applies to section 355
divisions. 190 As a policy matter, the shareholder-level
"conti nuity of interest" doctrine should apply to section
355 if it serves a broader pu rpose than merely preventing
bailouts. The policy of the continuity of proprietary interest doctrine is that reorganization treatment should be
limited to historic shareholders who maintain a Significant
proprietary interest in the continuing corporations. '9' The
1989 revisions apply the continuity of interest doctrine to
corporate divisions by requiring that the historic shareholders maintain continuity in each of the resulting
corporations. '92
The 1989 regulations add four examples illustrating the
continuity of interest requirement, "the principles of
which are based on previously established revenue ru lings ." '93 In contrast to the other section 355 regulation
areas , neither the text nor the Preamble spell out the
parameters of the continuity of interest requirement itself.
Nonetheless, the examples indicate some boundaries.
Continuity of interest exists where the prior owners in the
aggregate retain at least 50 percent of their equity interest in each of the post-division corporations . ,g 4 Con versely, retention of only a 20 percent interest by a former
owner (or owners) in one of the post-division corporations
is not sufficient. ' 95
The probable reason for the absence of further explanation of continuity of interest doctrine is that the government does not spell out the parameters of the doctrine as
to an acquisitive reorganization as defined in section 368,
merely requiring a 50 percent continuity for advance
ruling purposes.'9" The case law had allowed a consider-

"'Treas. reg, section 1,355-2(c) (1955) (included in paragraph
captioned "Business Purpose") .
'69 Whitman, supra note 8, at 1239, 1241: Cf. Rafferty, 452 F.2d
at 770 (prefer approach of requiring showing in case of personal
motives as to distribution with bailout potential th at such motives
were "germane to the continuance of the corporate business . ..
overreliance upon formulations such as 'business purpose,' and
'active business' ").
,ooProp , Treas , reg , section 1.355-2(b)(2) (1977) (next to last
sentence) ("continu ity of interest" added to caption of paragraph) ,
"' See Sheppard, "Section 355 Regulations," supra note 148, at
274-75: Faber, supra note 149.
'92Treas , reg . section 1,355-2(c)( 1) (1989) states:
[Sect ion ] 355 requ ires that one or more persons who,
directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise
prior to the distribution or exchange own, in the aggregate,
an amount of stock establishing a contin uity of interest in
each of the modified corporate forms in wh ich the enterprise is conducted after the separation.
'"'Preamble, supra, 54 Fed , Reg , 291: Treas. reg , section 1,3552(c)(2) (1989).
"' Id, section 1.355-2(c)(2) Ex. (2) .
'"' Id, section 1.355-2(c)(2) Ex. (4) .
"'Rev. Proc, 77-37 , section 3,02, 1977-2 C.B, 568, 569.
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ably lower level , but not as low as 20 percent. 197 The
revised regulations continue the statement in prior versions that "section 355 contemplates the continued operation of the business or businesses existing prior to th e
separation .",gS The general reorganization regulations
historically had used similar language in referring to
"continuity of business enterprise" requirement.'99 Treasury recently interpreted this in the acquisitive reorganization context as requiring either continuation of the
target's "historic business" or use of a significant portion
of target's historic business assets in a business. 2oo "Significant" here may require business use of one-third of
T's historic assets.201 Private rulings under section 355,
however, have found the "active business" requirement
satisfied when as little as five or six percent of the assets
of one of the post-division corporations was used in the
active conduct of a trade or business. 202

The 1989 revisions apply the continuity of Interest doctrine to corporate divisions . ...

While the business purpose and continuity of proprietary interest requirements can effectuate policies not met
by the statutory requirements, the continuity of business
enterprise doctrine's objectives would be covered by the
device test.2° 3 The absence of examples and discussion
on the 1989 Preamble indicate that the reference on the
new regulations was more a reflex action than thoughtful
requirement.

\9' The most commonly reli ed upon case law benchmark is 38
percent or 40 percent derived from John A. Nelson Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935). The Court found the requisite
continuity of proprietary interest where the target corporation 's
assets were transferred for 38 percent preferred stock in the
acquiring company and 62 percent cash. See generally
Schneider, supra note 37, at 599 n. 185.
"·Compare Treas . reg. section 1.355-1(b) (1989) with Treas.
reg . section 1.355- 1(b) (1955) and Prop. Treas. reg. section
1.355-1(b) (1977) .
'··Matthews, "Conference Covers the Waterfront on 1989 Tax
Issues," 42 Tax Notes 1540 (March 27, 1989).
2OOTreas. reg. section 1.368-1(d)(2) (1980) .
'0' Ct. Treas. reg . sections 1.368- 1(d)(3)(ii) and (5) Ex. (1)
(continuation of a significant line of business satisfied by con tinuation of one of three equal lines) . These regulations also
provide that determination of whether a portion of assets is
"significant" is " based on the relative importance of the assets to
operation of the business. However, all other facts and circumstances, such as net fair market value of those assets, will be
considered." Id. section 1.368- 1(d)(4)(iii) .
,0'GCM 34238 (five percent) ; Llr. Ruling 8712019 (s ix percent).
See Silverman , "Corporate Divisions Under Section 355," 41st
Va. Conf. on Fed . Tax'n 124 (June 1,1989).
203A predistribution sale of most of the active business assets
and the ho lding of the proceeds by either or both of the postdivision corporations would constitute evidence of device. Treas.
reg . section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(B) (1989) . If, however, neither the
device nor the active business test would cover the sa le (not
"i mmediately after" the separation) by a post-division corporation of su bstantially all of its active business assets, then the
continuity of business enterprise doctrine should be available.
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III. WHAT IS NEXT?
Ironically, the 1986 repeal of the capital gains preference has in most cases eliminated the traditional advantage of an earnings bailout over a dividend payment in
the absence of offsetting capital losses.204 Shareholder
basiS recovery is the only remaining issue. But with the
1986 repeal of the General Utilities shelter for corporate
asset appreciation in non liquidating and liquidating distributions, 205 the planning and policy focus now is on
deferring recognition of inside gain in a corporate division. 206 Potential abuses include (1) a deferred non pro
rata split-off/Esmark transaction in which P purchases a
minority interest in T (or at least less than 80 percent).
waits a decent interval (say two years), and then exchanges the minority T stock interest for a desired
division of T, a section 355 division;207 and (2) T distributes
an incorporated division pro rata to its shareholders
anticipating that after a decent interval, they will sell it to
P in a transactional carryover basis acquisition .208 In both
cases, T has escaped tax on inside gain.
The continuity of proprietary interest test looks both
backward and forward . The 1989 regulations do not
address how long before and after the corporate separation this continuity must exist. Practitioners use two
years as a rule of thumb (based on the facts of a
published ruling) for the continuity of interest lookback
period, and presumably, they use the same period to look
forward as well. 209 Whether any waiting period clearly
establishes continuity of interest where a post-acquisition
division is contemplated at acquisition or a post-division

2°'Restoration of the capital gains preference as to se lected
capital assets , specifically including stock , is much in the news
these days. See " Capital Gains Issue," 43 Tax Notes 1009-32
(May 22, 1989) and cites id. at 1029.
205Thus, sections 336 and 338 now treat a liquidating distribution and the erstwhile deemed liquidating distribution as a
deemed (recognition) sale at the corporate level at fair market
value . 1954 Code section 337 providing a corporate level shield
as to bulk sales pursuant to a timely liqu idation simply has been
repea led.
206See Sheppard , "Sect ion 355 Regulations," supra note 148.
2°' lf P purchases 80 percent or more of T, then P must hold the
T stock for five years before distributing the unwanted assets in
corporate so lution pursuant to section 355. IRC section 355
(b)(2)(D) .
206When in early January 1989 I sketched this scenario to the
National Office ruling speCialist, his response was to the effect
that what was done after two years was not relevant.
2O·Sheppard, " Section 355 Regulations," supra note 148, at 274
(Rev. Ru!. 74-5, 1974-1 C.B. 82, accepted a distribution two years
after the purchase); Sheppard, "Spin Cycle: Whither Section
355," 38 Tax Notes 109 (January 11, 1988). Attempts to skirt the
two-year waiting requirement using devices such as "alphabet"
or subsidiary tracking stock will probably and properly be
thwarted by the new sect ion 337(d) regulations to come. See
Sheppard , "Trier Discusses Corporate Tax Issues; Section 355
Regulations Are Imminent," 41 Tax Notes 1368 (December 28,
1988).
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sale is contemplated at the time of division, is highly
prob iematical. 2IO
In the limited area of a corporate distributee which
acquired "contro l" (80 percent stock interest) of the
distributing corporation, Congress imposed in 1987 a
five-year ho lding per iod requirement.2 " Professors Simon
and Simmons convincing ly argue that a broader five-year
ho lding period requ irement going forward should be
statutori ly extended (while st ill requiring only 40 to 50
percent aggregate conti nuity in each post-distribution
corporation) .212

Practitioners use two years as a rule of thumb
... for the continuity of Interest lookback perlod ... .

A forward-looking holding period poses many more
problems. First, as Professors Simon and Simmons point
out ,213 unless a floor approach (say five percent or more
of all shareholders) is used , section 355 would be unavailable to publicly traded corporations due to the current
heavy annual turnover in their stock. Second, postdistribution sales are already the subject of the device
standards. Third, distinctions between pro rata and non
pro rata separations would have to be drawn. Otherwise,
hostile non pro rata divisions would give the shareholders of each post-division corporation a means to
trigger at least inside corporate level recognit ion of gain
to the other corporation(s) by selling all of the stock of
their post-division corporation shortly after the corporate
division . And fourth, the inside gain recognition problem
is inextricab ly tied to the policy of safeguarding the 1986

"'The Seventh Circuit found that the step-transaction applied
and continuity of interes t was broken where target shareholders
and purchasing shareholders both expected that the ta rget
shareholders would sel l the ir purchasing stock in a subsequent
optional piggyback reg istration (the economics dictated that the
target share ho lders wou ld so opt and they did) . McDonald's of
Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982) . An abusive
situation may prompt application of the step transaction where
the inten t to engage in a post-acquisition non pro rata division or
post-division sa le is equal ly strong or clear but the economic
inducement is less strong. A lesser, but still potential danger is
that a post-distribution contemplated shareholder sale of the
spun -off controlled su bsid iary will be imputed back to the
distributed corporation under an extension of Commissioner v.
Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949) ,
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955, reh'ing denied, 339 U.S. 416 (1950) ,
and Bush Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 252 (6th Cir.
1982) . The Tax Court has recently applied a " more relaxed test "
where th e distributed property is neither inventory nor its equ ivalent, viz.; the distribu ting corporation must in substance have
sold the property. Anderson v. Commissioner, 92 T .C. NO. 9
(Jan . 26,1989) (1989) .
''' IRC sec tio n 355(b)(2)(D) .
"'Simon & Simmons, supra note 174, at 299, 300.
''' Id. at 297.
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repeal of the General Utilities doctrine 2 14 and the issue of
self-help elective carryover basis acquisitions when only
part of target's assets are desired .215 Any further amendments to section 355 should take the form of reopening
year one (at the shareholder and corporate levels) along
the lines of section 302(c)(2)(A) (flush paragraph) , if a
triggering sale occurs.

21'The 1986 repeal of the codified General Utilities doctrine
(noncorporate-Ievel recognition upon (a) nonliquidat ing and
liqu idating distributions of property, 1954 Code sections 311
and 336, and (b) sales and dee med sales pursuant to liquidations
and deemed liquidations, 1954 Code sections 337 and 338) was
in large part rat ionalized as needed to preven t artifi cial encouragement of mergers.
A corporat ion acquiring the assets of a liquidating corporation was able to obtain a basis in assets equal to their
fair market va lue, although the transferor recognized no
gain (other than possibly recapture amounts) on the sale.
The tax benefits made the assets potentially more valuable
in the hands of a transferee than in the hands of the
current owner. This might induce corporations with su bstantia l appreciated assets to liquidate and transfer their
assets to other corporations for tax reasons, wh en economic considerations might indicate a different course of
action. Staff Joint Comm. , General Explanation of th e Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (H .R. 3838). 386 (1987) .
The reality was that due to the " reca ptu re income" (including
statutory depreciation recaptu re) override to the General Utilities
shield , see id. at 333-34, 336, most corporate acquiSitions of
cap ital intensive corporations during th e late 1954 Code were
not cast as cost-basis acquisitions because the impact of th e
recapture income tax exceeded the present valu e of the basis
step-up-an exception then (and now) arose where target's
NOLs would offset t he gain recognized upon liquidation . See
Lee, supra, 8 Va. Tax Rev . at 116-17 and n. 251. The real tax goal,
particularly in leveraged buyouts (other than use of interest
deductions to shelter target's income) , was to dispose of unwanted target assets (bust-up takeovers) wi tho ut triggering an
inside corporate tax on appreciation . This is where " mirror
transactions, " "son of mirror," etc., and section 355 come in. See
Sheppard, " Mirror Moves : Life Without the General Utilities
Ru le," 32 Tax Notes 847 (September 1, 1986); Sheppard, " Enforcing General Utilities Repeal ," 32 Tax Notes 121 7 (September 29,
1986) ; Sheppard , "The Prodigal Son of Mirror, " 34 Tax Notes 444
(February 2, 1987) ; Axe lrod, "Section 304, Excess Loss Accoun ts
and Other Consolidated Return Gall imaufry," 36 Tax Notes 729
(August 17, 1987); Sheppa rd , " Through th e Looking Glass, " 35
Tax Notes 436 (May 4, 1987) ; Sheppard, " Spin Cycle, " supra
note 209; Walter, " Spin- Otis, Split-Offs and Split- Ups in TwoStep Acquis iti ons and Dispositions," 66 Taxes 970 (1988); Pull man , Warner & Jacokes , " Noti ce 87-14 and the Section 1503
(e)(3)(A) Regulation s, " 42 Tax Notes 737 (Feb. 6, 1989) . Availability of such techniques to avoid inside recognition would
encourage or at least fac ilitate takeovers or at least acquisitions
of non-recently spun-off parts of ta rget s (or acquisitions of part
of target to enable a non pro rata division a while later) .
"'A notion that has been batted about is that " mirror tran sactions" and other transactional elect ive carryover basis as to
selected lines of business techniques, presumably including
pred ivision acquisition of a minority interest looking forward to
non pro rata division and pro rata divis ion looking forward to a
late r sale , are not inconsistent with the General Utilities repeal
because they permit only an outside stock basis ste p-up and in
effect an elective carryover basis. See, e.g ., letters by Pete r
Faber, Esq., 32 Tax Notes 1022 (September 8, 1986) ; 32 Tax
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Very early in the development of section 355 un d er the
1954 Code, " prestigious groups of commentators," in
Whitman 's words,2 '6 recommended t hat t he severity of
the section 355 definitional requiremen ts be mitigated by
statutorily granting the Service the power to rule favorably
on otherwise taxable transactions . Whitman 's telling criticism then was the lack of standards to guide this discretion . Now that the revised regulations have substantially
eased this severity and have provided ample structured
discretion for the exercise of this ruling authority, the
policy of mandatory advance approval should be reconsidered , not to lighten the impact of section 355 this t ime,
but to implement it. A mandatory advance ruling regime
shol,Jld provide very simple procedures for common,
nonabusive transactions, for example, non pro rata divisions of small active businesses between small numbers
of historic shareholders . Alternatively, more narrow mechanical rules without an advance ruling requirement
could be provided (optiona l or mandatory) for simple
transactions with mandatory structured discretion for
more complex transactions .

The Service's recent decision not to give comfort rulings . .. should not prevent adoption of a
mandatory advance ruling program for section
355 transactions.

The Service's recent decision not to give comfort
rulings to transactions where the legal result is readily
ascertainable should not prevent adoption of a mandatory
advance ruling program for section 355 transactions. 217
Nor should the recent Service announcement that it will
refuse to rule that there is a business purpose for a
distribution of controlled corporation stock : where Federal tax savings are greater than state tax savings; where

Federal tax reductions coexist with foreign tax reductions;
or whether potential Federal tax savings are the substantial motivation of a transaction with a different asserted
business purpose.218 Some inside and outside of government argue , however, that the government has nothing to
gain from approvi ng taxpayers' asserted business purposes if the result is to hamstring the Service when it later
questions the propriety of the deferral for the transaction ! '9

The regulations could provide more mechanical
rules lor transactions not seeking advance
approval .. ..

What can the government do in the absence of mandatory advance ruling requirements?220 First, both the corporation and the shareholder could be required to redflag section 355 transactions in which no advance ruling
is sought. This requirement should work somewhat along
the lines of section 751 (b) transactions Y' Second , the
regulations could provide more mechanical rules for
transactions not seeking advance approval , but the litigation experience under section 355 (Coady and Rafferty)
suggests that this should be implemented only with a
statutory foundation . Third, consideration should be given
to inducements for seeking a ruling . A ruling has advantages in addition to certainty of result, as illustrated by
regulations under section 755 and elsewhere .222

IV. CON CLUSION
The evolution of the section 355 regulations from 1955
to 1989 remarkably parallels Professor Davis' thoughts
about "Discretionary Justice." Starting with a broad legislative and tax common-law framework - requirements
relating to active business, device, business purpose, and
continuity of interest-the regulation drafters first employed bare bones tests in all areas, except the active

Notes 1205 (September 22, 1986) . Beyond the fact that Congress

has not yet enacted elective carryover basis, see letter by
Michael Schier, id. at 1204, elective carryover basis under the
final 1985 subchapter C proposals would not extend to such
partial asset acquisitions. See Staff Sen . Fin . Comm .. "The
Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985," 99th Cong ., 1st Sess. 50 (S .
Print 47, 1985) (acquisition of control of target or 70 percent of
gross fair market value or 90 percent of net fair market value
necessary for elective carryover basis) . Furthermore, if as expected " mirror transactions, " etc., are stopped by Treasury, use
of section 355 to achieve the same "elective" carryover basis
without recognition of inside appreciation by the distributing
corporation perversely will favor friendly takeovers of desired
assets over hostile bust-up takeovers violating the tax policy of
horizontal equity or economic efficiency.
2'6Whitman, supra note 8, at 1249 (ALI and the House Ways
and Means Committee Advisory Group on subchapter C) .
217Rev, Proc. 89-34, 1989-20 IRB 145. The Service, however,
has decided to "back off" this policy for six months. Rosen ,
" 'Comfort Rulings' Stance Will Be Reversed, Scott Tells ABA
Tax Section ," 44 Tax Notes 629 (Aug. 7, 1989). Moreover, the
IRS more recently stated that the " no comfort rulings " policy
should not affect section 355 ruling requests. Ann. 89-105,198935 IRB 1, Q&A 12.
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218Rev. Proc . 89-39, 1989-25 IRB 17.
21"Sheppard, "Section 355 and Busin ess Purpose," 43 Tax
Notes 794 (May 15, 1989) .
22°The ideas following in text owe much to a brainstorming
session with my colleagues Elmer Schaefer and Alan Gunn.
221 Treas. reg . section 1.751 - 1(b)(5). Return preparers (and
apparently practitioners in general) frequently if not universally
"overlook " this requirement or more accurately section 751 (b)
itself, which has been argued as reason to repeal section 751(b) .
Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R 2571 , H.R . 3397, and H.R. 4448
(Issues Relating to Passthrough Entities) before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and
Means Comm ., 99th Cong ., 2d Sess . 61 (1986) (statement of Joel
Rabinovitz. Esq .). I think it is instead grounds to impose return
preparer penalties, malpractice sanctions, or fraud penalties
depending on the level of understanding of subchapter K practitioner-return preparer. The repeal the provision argument
reminds me of Queen Isabella's rationalization for expelling the
Spanish Jews in 1492-that they were causing the descendents
of the 1391 forced Jewish converts to Christianity to Judaize.
"'Treas. reg . section 1.755-' (a)(2): ct. Temp. Treas. reg . section 1.338-4T(t)(6)(iv) .
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business requirement. The 1955 regulatio ns set forth
more detailed principles and accompan ied them w ith
numerous examples wh ich were not, howeve r, exp licitl y
re lated to the rules in the text . With this fra mewor k, the
Service commenced ruling and litigati ng, princ ipa ll y focusi ng on t he active business t est at first and the n after a
decade on the device restricti on as well.

The 1989 revisions . .. do provide detailed and
... sensible guidelines for discretionary justice
as to the device standard.

Acting in an increasing ly collaborative mode, courts
and commentators attacked the Service's mechanical
reliance on the active business test (a nd particularly the
separate business corOllary), ca ll ing for primary reliance
upon a standard instead - the device restriction . The
government responded in 1977 with proposed amendments to the section 355 regulations. They embodied a
shift in emphasis from active business to device, expanded the device prinCiples, and reflected past ruling
experience and criticism in the commentary. The guidance about the mean ing of device was raised to about the
same level of soph istication as the 1955 active busi ness
provisions in the regulations. But the 1977 examples were
stil l not clear, and the proposed regulations fai led to
provide gu idelines for discretionary just ice.
The 1989 revisions reflecting further ruling experience

;n pa<l und" changed cond;l ;on, (Ihe a«.,malh of
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of the General Utilities doctrine in the 1986 Code) and the
suggestions of comme nte rs, do provide detailed and , I
believe, sensible, guideli nes for discretionary justice as
to the device standard . Furthermore, in all areas except
t he co ntinuity of interest doctrine, the new regulat ions
p rov ide a detailed framework of principles in text. Careful
ill ustrations oft en have cross ref erences to text and
usually explicitly tie together the principles and examp les
in the Preamble. (Should this excellent format continue,
the Code of Federal Regulations and commercial publishers of tax regulations will need to include the preamble
with the regulat ions as the Federal Register does .)
Althoug h further refinement is possible in the continuity
of interest con t ext, the 1989 regulations otherwise take
the current section 355 about as far as it can go. Congress
should revise section 355 in a more substantia l way than
the 1987 revision. Now that structured discretionary justice is available , mandatory advance rulings by the Service
should be required (with increased costs passed on to
the users). A simplified check-the-box fo rm should be
provided for garden variety, especially non pro rata ,
vertical or separate business divisions. A statutory fiveyear holding period to establish c,:,ntinuity of interest
shou ld be enacted . Elective carryover basis, which would
excuse corporations from recognition of inside gain . also
should be enacted and decoupled from the reorganization
provisons. A five-year hold ing period going forward
should be requi red for pro rata divisions , and bolstered
by the th reat of reopening year one at the corporate and
shareholder levels if post-distribution sa les create a bailout shou ld be cons idered . But for the present. let us
celebrate a job well done in the 1989 revised regulations.

'epea® ______________________
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